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A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF HEALTH CARE 
FRAUD ENFORCEMENT 
 
Joan H. Krause* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The numbers are staggering: an estimated 10 percent of the 
federal health care budget lost to fraud.1 More than $12 billion 
improperly paid out by Medicare in fiscal year 2001—a number all 
the more striking in that it represents significant progress from 
prior years.2 Corporate health care defendants settling fraud 
allegations for hundreds of millions of dollars in civil penalties and 
 
 
*Associate Professor of Law & Co-Director, Health Law & Policy Institute, 
University of Houston Law Center; J.D. Stanford Law School, B.A. Yale 
University. The author is grateful to David Hyman, Gerry Moohr, Dayna 
Matthew, Richard Saver, and Sandra Guerra Thompson for their advice 
regarding preparation of this article, and to Gwen Chapman for her research 
assistance. This research was supported by a University of Houston Law Center 
Summer Research Stipend. Portions of this research were presented to the 
American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 26th Annual Health Law Teachers 
Conference in June 2002, and to the Houston Bar Association Health Law 
Section in May 2002. 
1 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 3 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5266, 5268 (estimating 1 to 10 percent of the federal budget is lost to fraud). 
See, e.g., David A. Hyman, HIPAA and Health Care Fraud: An Empirical 
Perspective, 22 CATO J. 151, 159 (2002) (arguing that “[a]lthough the figure of 
10 percent was an effective political statistic, it has no empirical foundation”). 
2 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR 
GEN., NO. A-17-01-02002, IMPROPER FISCAL YEAR 2001 MEDICARE FEE-FOR- 
SERVICE PAYMENTS 1 (2002) (acknowledging the error rate represented a 
significant reduction from the $23.2 billion in improper payments identified in 
1996, the first year such audits were conducted), available at http://oig.hhs. 
gov/oas/reports/cms/a0102002.pdf. 
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criminal fines.3 Federal health care fraud recoveries of more than a 
billion dollars a year, of which a significant percentage can be used 
to fund future enforcement efforts.4 If nothing else, it’s clear there 
is money in health care fraud—on both sides of the law. 
Federal health care fraud enforcement takes place in an 
atmosphere characterized by an increasing number of requirements 
placed on the health care providers and professionals who 
participate in the federal health care programs, such as Medicare 
and Medicaid.5 The federal health care programs are subject to an 
enormous number of legal provisions, spanning hundreds of 
thousands of pages.6 While some commentators contend that the 
 
 
3 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. 
and Seven Others Charged with Health Care Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay 
$875 Million to Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001) (announcing record-setting 
settlement), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ. 
htm. See also Kidney Dialysis Firm Will Pay $496 Million, Plead Guilty to 
Defrauding Health Programs, 9 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 127 (Jan.  
27, 2000) (announcing prior record-setting settlement). In December 2002, the 
government announced the settlement of long-standing litigation against the 
former Columbia/HCA for-profit hospital chain, which ultimately will total $1.7 
billion dollars. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Press Statement Re: HCA 
(Dec. 18, 2002) (announcing settlement), available at http://www.usdoj. 
gov/opa/pr/2002/December/02_civ_731.htm. 
4 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH 
CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE CONTROL PROGRAM ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 2001 
(2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/hipaa01fe19. 
htm [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT 2001]; infra Part I (describing the allocation 
of anti-fraud resources). 
5 In the federal health care programs, the term “provider” technically refers 
to institutional entities, such as hospitals, home health agencies, and nursing 
homes. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(u) (2003) (defining “provider of services”). Because 
they face similar fraud liability, this article will use the term “provider” to refer 
more broadly to both individual health care professionals and institutional 
entities. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL ADVISORY BULLETIN: 
PRACTICES OF BUSINESS CONSULTANTS 1, n.1 (2001) (using term to include, 
“providers, suppliers, and practitioners that provide items or services payable in 
whole or in part by a Federal health care program”), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/ consultants.pdf. 
6 Several years ago, staff at one medical center counted 132,720 pages of 
Medicare laws and regulations alone. See Mayo Chronicles Medicare Regs: It’s 
132,720 Pages of Red Tape, MODERN HEALTHCARE, Mar. 15, 1999, at 64. 
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recent proliferation of fraud cases can be blamed on the fact “that 
healthcare regulations have just become too complicated to 
understand,”7 their arguments have won little sympathy in the halls 
of Congress and the annals of public opinion. 
At the same time, the legal provisions governing health care 
fraud have become similarly complex. At the federal level, health 
care fraud is subject to a curious hybrid of ex ante and ex post 
enforcement mechanisms.8 Not surprisingly, the powerful ex post 
enforcement powers exercised by federal officials—i.e., 
prosecutions resulting in massive criminal and civil liability—have 
received the most attention. Given that both the health care 
industry and the government share the goal of preventing fraud 
before it occurs, however, the focus has shifted in recent years to 
informal guidance offering advice to health care providers on how 
to structure their activities to fit the law. Some of this  advice 
comes in the form of opinions responding to individual queries, 
while other guidance takes the form of broad policy statements 
applicable to the entire industry.9 This guidance does not operate  
as pure ex ante regulation because providers are not required to 
demonstrate compliance with these criteria before furnishing 
services to program beneficiaries.10 While not required for initial 
participation in the federal health care programs, however, 
compliance may be required in order to continue participation in 
the programs once fraud allegations are made.11 Thus, providers 
 
 
 
7 Uwe E. Reinhardt, Medicare Can Turn Anyone Into a Crook, WALL ST.  
J., Jan. 21, 2000, at A28. 
8 See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and the 
Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1280-81 (1999) 
(setting forth the typology of regulatory enforcement schemes). 
9 See, e.g., infra Parts III.B.1.a (discussing the advisory opinion process), 
III.B.1.b (discussing industry-wide fraud alerts) & III.B.1.c (discussing 
compliance guidances). 
10 See Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1282-85 (discussing public ex ante 
enforcement). 
11 See Office of the Inspector Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreements: 
General Information (describing the requirements of Corporate Integrity 
Agreements, which often are required as part of settlement), at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2003). 
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may have no practical choice but to “voluntarily” comply with the 
agency’s position as expressed in such guidance—even if it 
includes requirements not found in the underlying statutes or 
regulations.12 
In the health care context, this guidance currently is provided  
in three distinct ways: through the processes of regulation, 
information, and litigation.13 Despite the fact that only regulations 
promulgated through the notice-and-comment process are legally 
binding, anti-fraud efforts increasingly rely on informal 
expressions of agency views, as well as the use of public and 
private litigation to address ambiguities in substantive regulation.14 
While this development offers increased guidance to the industry 
as to the scope of permissible activities, it simultaneously raises 
troubling concerns about subjecting health care providers to 
unofficial—and potentially inconsistent—legal interpretations. 
This article analyzes the tripartite health care fraud 
enforcement framework. Part I offers a brief introduction to health 
care fraud, focusing on recent federal fraud initiatives. Part II 
addresses three of the key federal health care fraud laws: the Civil 
False Claims Act (FCA), the Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback 
Statute, and the so-called “Stark Law” prohibiting physician self- 
referrals.15 Part III analyzes the impact of the tripartite regulation- 
information-litigation model on health care providers. Part IV 
addresses the implications of this model, arguing that the 
combination of cumbersome rulemaking procedures, the 
proliferation of unofficial guidance, and the growing use of 
litigation may create an increasingly untenable situation for the 
health care industry. 
The article concludes by offering suggestions for how this 
model could be refined, focusing on regulatory clarity as a 
 
 
12 Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1287 (identifying similar “intermediate modes 
of enforcement”). 
13 “Litigation” might well have been deemed “enforcement” by this 
Author—except that it does not rhyme. 
14  See discussion infra Part III.B.2. 
15 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2003) (Civil False Claims Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 
1320a-7b(b) (2003) (Anti-Kickback Statute); 42 U.S.C. §1395nn (2003) (Stark 
Law). 
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necessary precondition for a legitimate fraud enforcement 
framework. The principle of regulatory clarity requires the 
development of clear rules governing the conduct of health care 
providers, supported by substantial penalties for clear violations. 
Under the current system, by contrast, fraud is addressed through a 
confusing combination of intricately detailed rules and vague 
aspirational pronouncements. While this approach offers the 
flexibility needed to address new developments in the ever- 
changing health care market, it less clearly serves the goals of 
clarity and efficiency—raising the troubling possibility that, in the 
eyes of the health care industry, we are willing to sacrifice the 
legitimacy of the enforcement process. 
 
I. HEALTH CARE FRAUD AS A NATIONAL FOCUS 
 
Health care fraud has been a top priority for federal law 
enforcement at least since 1994, when former Attorney General 
Janet Reno deemed it her “number two priority,” second only to 
violent crime.16 Although one might question whether the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) had more pressing priorities at the 
time, the motivation for the announcement was clear: as the 
authors of one treatise note, health care fraud is “where the money 
is.”17 The first audit of Medicare fee-for-service payments found 
that more than $23 billion had been paid out improperly in fiscal 
year 1996 alone.18 Although the numbers have improved  each 
year, auditors still estimate that $12.1 billion in improper Medicare 
payments were made in fiscal year 2001.19 
 
 
16 See 1994 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
ag/annualreports/ar94/finalag.txt (last visited July 7, 2000). 
17 ROBERT FABRIKANT, ET AL., HEALTH CARE FRAUD: ENFORCEMENT AND 
COMPLIANCE 1-3 (2002) (paraphrasing statements made by the infamous bank 
robber Willie Sutton). 
18 See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, supra note 2 (reviewing  
1996 data). 
19 Id. Of course, it is not clear that all these improper payments can be 
attributed to “fraud” rather than to errors or good faith disagreements. See 
Waste, Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement: Hearing Before the Task Force on 
Health of the House Committee on the Budget, 106th Cong. 117 (2000) 
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Consistent with this focus, recent years have seen more funds 
appropriated to the federal agencies with jurisdiction over health 
care fraud, particularly the DOJ and the Department of Health & 
Human Services (HHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG). The 
key to this funding was the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).20 Among other things, 
HIPAA created a “Fraud and Abuse Control Program” designed to 
coordinate federal, state, and local health care fraud enforcement 
efforts.21 The centerpiece of this effort is the “Health Care Fraud 
and Abuse Control Account,” which funds health care fraud 
inspections, investigations, and prosecutions undertaken by the 
DOJ and OIG.22 HIPAA set Control Account appropriations at 
$104 million in fiscal year 1997, with an increase of up to 15 
percent per year through 2003.23 In fiscal year 2001, the Attorney 
General and the Secretary of HHS certified $181 million for 
appropriation to the Control Account, with the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) receiving a separate appropriation of $88 
million.24 
The DOJ and OIG benefit in both direct and indirect ways from 
these appropriations. Directly, this guaranteed source of funding 
has permitted the hiring of additional FBI and OIG agents assigned 
specifically to health care fraud.25 Indirectly, a form of an 
 
 
(statement of the OIG, explaining that the “objective is not to determine the 
extent of fraud in the Medicare program”), available at http://frwebgate. 
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_house_hearings&docid= 
f:64510.wais. 
20 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
21 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7c (2003) (establishing the “Fraud and Abuse 
Control Program”). 
22 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(3) (2003) (describing the appropriations to the 
account). 
23 Id. §§ 1395i(k)(3)(A)-(B) (setting out the maximum amounts available  
for appropriation). 
24 See ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 4. 
25 See, e.g., id. at App. (noting that the FBI’s total allotment was used to 
support 445 existing agents and to hire an additional 30 agents); Enforcement: 
Terrorism Focus Has Not Diverted Resources from Health Fraud Probes, FBI 
Official Says, 6 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 155, 156 (Feb. 20, 2002) 
(stating the FBI expected to hire 2,000 more health care agents over the next two 
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attenuated “bounty” system exists, whereby some of the money 
collected from health care fraud recoveries is available for 
appropriation back to the enforcement agencies. HIPAA directed 
the bulk of these recoveries to be deposited into the perennially 
near-insolvent Medicare Part A Trust Fund.26 A significant portion 
of this money, however, can be appropriated back to the Health 
Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account to fund future law 
enforcement activities.27 As one commentator has noted, “although 
this is not a pure bounty system, it is much closer than had 
previously been the case.”28 
These investments have clearly paid off. The DOJ recently 
announced that it recovered more than $980 billion in civil health 
care fraud suits and investigations in fiscal year 2002.29 This 
represents a slight reduction from fiscal year 2001, when the 
government won or negotiated more than $1.7 billion in health  
care cases and collected $1.3 billion.30 Rather than signifying a 
downturn in enforcement activities, however, this difference is 
largely attributable to the fact that awards often are not collected in 
the same year in which they are negotiated, and to the ease with 
 
 
years). In the fall of 2001, there were rumors that many of these agents had been 
pulled from health care investigations to staff anti-terrorism initiatives; however, 
the FBI later announced that health care fraud staffing remained unchanged. Id. 
(quoting FBI Health Care Unit Chief Timothy Delaney). 
26 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(2)(C) (authorizing the transfer of fines, penalties, 
and damages obtained in health care fraud cases to the Trust Fund); Sarah 
Lueck, Some Premiums for Medicare to Rise 12.4%, WALL ST. J., March 27, 
2003, at B2 (reporting on Medicare’s insolvency). 
27 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(3) (explaining the appropriations process for the 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account). 
28 Roger Feldman, The Regulation of Managed Care Organizations and the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 569, 574 (2001) (discussing 
fraud and abuse in medical care and the inefficient attempts to curb it). See also 
Hyman, supra note 1, at 158 (“Although this structure prevents the 
government’s fraud control system from operating on a pure bounty system, 
there is still considerable suspicion in the provider community on this point.”). 
29 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department Recovers Over $1 Billion in 
FY 2002 (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/ 
December/02_civ_720.htm. 
30 See ANNUAL REPORT 2001, supra note 4 (listing statistics). 
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which a particularly large settlement can skew the statistics for any 
given year.31 
In addition to pursuing allegations of fraud against individual 
providers, the government developed proactive initiatives targeting 
particular sectors of the health care industry for intensive scrutiny. 
The prototype for such initiatives was “Operation Restore Trust,” a 
coordinated federal/state effort in the mid-1990s focusing on fraud 
by home health agencies, nursing homes, hospices, and durable 
medical equipment suppliers in states with large Medicare 
populations.32 Subsequent national and regional initiatives have 
included the “72-Hour Window Project” targeting hospital bills for 
outpatient services provided within 72 hours of a related inpatient 
admission;33 the “Physicians at Teaching Hospitals” (PATH) 
investigations targeting academic institutions where attending 
physicians have billed for services actually provided by interns and 
residents;34 and the “Lab Unbundling Project” investigating 
hospital laboratories that may improperly have submitted separate 
bills for laboratory tests performed simultaneously.35 In the future, 
we are likely to see continued targeting of entire sectors of the 
health care industry, with better coordination among the relevant 
state and federal authorities. 
Similarly, history teaches us that the anti-fraud focus tends to 
be cyclical. At the start of the 1990s, the focus was squarely on 
 
 
 
31 Id. (“It should be emphasized that some of the judgments, settlements, 
and administrative impositions in 2001 will result in collections in future years, 
just as some of the collections in 2001 are attributable to actions from prior 
years.”). 
32 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ORT 12-96-00020,  OPERATION 
RESTORE TRUST ACTIVITIES (1995) (describing the initiative), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-12-96-00020.pdf. 
33  See   GEN.   ACCOUNTING   OFFICE,    GAO/HEHS-98-195,   MEDICARE: 
APPLICATION OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT TO HOSPITAL BILLING PRACTICES (July 
1998) (reviewing the 72-Hour Window Project). 
34 See Pamela H. Bucy, The PATH from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise 
of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching 
Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3 (2000) (describing the PATH initiative). 
35 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 33 (reviewing the Lab 
Unbundling Project). 
HEALTH CARE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT 63 
prescription drug sales and marketing activities.36 Within a few 
years, the focus had shifted to fraudulent activities by 
laboratories,37 to PATH audits of teaching physicians,38 and to 
alleged improprieties by hospices and home health agencies.39 By 
the late 1990s, nursing homes increasingly found themselves under 
scrutiny for fraud based on alleged quality-of-care deficiencies.40 
Most recently, there has been renewed interest in the activities of 
prescription drug companies, this time involving pricing practices 
in addition to sales and marketing activities.41 Thus, health care 
providers can take little comfort in current enforcement priorities: 
if one health care sector currently is not on the fraud “radar 
screen,” history tells us that it soon may be. 
For a variety of reasons, it is not altogether clear what the Bush 
Administration will do with regard to health care fraud 
enforcement. Attorney General John Ashcroft indicated his support 
for some health care fraud initiatives in his confirmation hearings, 
albeit perhaps not as strongly as his predecessor.42 And after 
 
 
 
36  See OFFICE  OF  THE INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-01-90-00480, PROMOTION OF 
PRESCRIPTION DRUGS THROUGH PAYMENTS AND GIFTS (1991). 
37 See Leon Aussprung, Fraud and Abuse: Federal Civil Health Care 
Litigation and Settlement, 19 J. LEG. MED. 1, 8-9 (1998) (describing “Labscam” 
cases); Office of the Inspector Gen., Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements For the 
Provision of Clinical Laboratory Services (1994), reprinted in Publication of 
OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,377 (Dec. 19, 1994) 
(warning of fraudulent laboratory practices). 
38 See generally Bucy, supra note 34 (describing the PATH initiative). 
39 See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert on Physician Liability 
For Certifications in the Provision of Medical Equipment and Supplies and 
Home Health Services, 64 Fed. Reg. 1813 (Jan. 12, 1999), available at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/dme.htm; Publication of OIG 
Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in Nursing Home Arrangements With 
Hospices, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,415 (Apr. 24, 1998). 
40 See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing 
Home Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,289, 14,295 n.49 (Mar. 16, 2000). 
41 See Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5, 1993) (setting forth 
the OIG’s general views on drug manufacturer activities). 
42 See, e.g., Ashcroft Views Qui Tam Provisions as “Vital” in Fight Against 
Fraud, HEALTH L. NEWS, Mar. 2001, at 10. 
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September 11, 2001—and the recent corporate fraud scandals—the 
DOJ may have more immediate enforcement priorities.43 Clearly it 
would be a mistake, however, for health care providers to assume 
they can act with impunity because the government’s attention lies 
elsewhere. 
 
II. KEY HEALTH CARE FRAUD LAWS 
 
Health care fraud is addressed by a variety of federal and state 
laws. Some of these laws, such as the Medicare and Medicaid 
Anti-Kickback Statute, are directed at improper activities in the 
health care market.44 Others, such as the Civil False Claims Act 
(FCA), apply more broadly to entities that transact business with 
the federal government.45 Health care fraud also is  actionable 
under broad criminal statutes such as Mail and Wire Fraud, which 
are applicable to criminal conduct regardless of the business 
context in which it occurs.46 Of these myriad statutes, the FCA, 
Anti-Kickback Statute, and “Stark Law” self-referral prohibitions 
are by far the most important to health care providers on a daily 
basis. An introduction to these laws is necessary before the 
tripartite enforcement model can be understood. 
 
 
43 The DOJ FY 2004 budget request identified anti-terrorism efforts as the 
Department’s first goal; combating corporate fraud was listed second. See Press 
Release, Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Requires $23.3 Billion to 
Prevent and Combat Terrorism, Drug Crime, Crimes Against Children, and 
Corporate Fraud (Feb. 3, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/ 
2003/February/03_ag_067.htm. The DOJ FY 2002 Performance & 
Accountability Report, however, identifies health care fraud as the key focus of 
the Department’s second strategic goal, enforcing federal criminal laws. See 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2002 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, 
Strategic Goal 2.4A (Reduce Fraudulent Practices in the Health Care Industry) 
(2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/annualreports/ar2002/ 
sg2finalacctperftpt.htm. 
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7b(b) (2003). 
45 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2003). 
46 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2003). See, e.g., United States v. Talbott, 
590 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978) (affirming convictions for mail fraud and 
conspiracy to commit mail fraud based on a fraudulent scheme involving 
Medicaid dental benefits). 
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A. Civil False Claims Act 
The FCA was enacted in 1863 in response to reports of 
“rampant fraud” perpetrated on the Union army during the Civil 
War.47 While the statute prohibits a variety of fraudulent activities, 
the most commonly invoked provision imposes liability on a 
defendant when: (1) the defendant presents (or causes to be 
presented48) a claim for payment or approval; (2) the claim is false 
or fraudulent; and (3) the defendant’s acts are undertaken 
“knowingly.”49 This mental state includes not only actual 
knowledge, but also deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of 
truth or falsity.50 The types of “claims” subject to the Act include 
“any request or demand . . . for money or property” if any portion 
thereof comes from the federal government.51 
 
 
47 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5273 (noting that President Lincoln signed the FCA to combat rampant fraud in 
Civil War defense contracts); see generally JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE 
CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 1-1 to 1-38 (Supp. 1999) (providing an 
historical overview of the Act). 
48 “Cause to be presented” liability generally applies where the person 
responsible for the falsity does not actually submit the claim, but rather directs 
others (who may not know of the falsity) to submit the claim on his behalf. See, 
e.g., United States v. Kensington Hospital, 760 F. Supp. 1120, 1125 (E.D. Pa. 
1991) (alleging that physicians who were suspended from the Medicaid program 
“caused” a hospital to submit improper bills on their behalf). 
49 See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2003). See also BOESE, supra note 47, at 2-9 
(noting that violations of § 3729(a)(1) are the most common cause of liability 
under the FCA). A fourth potential element, harm to the government, remains 
controversial. See Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the Public Fisc: 
Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. 
REV. 121, 162-89 (2001) (discussing judicial approaches to fiscal harm under 
the FCA). Other relevant FCA provisions include § 3729(a)(2) (prohibiting the 
use of false records or statements to get a false or fraudulent claim allowed or 
paid); § 3729(a)(3) (prohibiting conspiracies “to defraud the government by 
getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid”); and § 3729(a)(7) 
(prohibiting “reverse false claims,” in which false records or statements are used 
“to conceal, avoid, or decrease an obligation to pay or transmit money or 
property to the Government”). 
50 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (2003). 
51 See id. § 3729(c). 
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Violators are subject to a civil penalty of $5,500 to $11,000 per 
claim, plus three times the amount of damages sustained by the 
government.52 Due to the way health care services are billed, it 
does not take long for such penalties to reach significant levels. 
Most health care providers generate a bill for each occasion of 
services rendered to each patient, resulting in the submission of 
thousands of small claims a year.53 Fraud tends to occur in small 
amounts, such as a few cents or a few dollars per claim.54 While 
treble damages are likely to be relatively reasonable in such cases, 
the per-claim penalties mount quickly.55 In United States v. Krizek, 
for example, a psychiatrist was accused of submitting 8,002 
claims, each inflated by approximately $30, for total damages of 
$245,000.56 At trial, the government requested penalties of $10,000 
per claim, for a total of $81 million.57 Combined with the threat of 
exclusion from federal health care programs, the FCA is one of the 
major reasons health care providers desire to settle fraud 
allegations.58 Thus, this general anti-fraud law has become a key 
 
 
52 Id. § 3729(a); 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (1999) (increasing statutory  
penalties by 10 percent). 
53 See Bucy, supra note 34, at 38 (“Because of the billing structure for most 
health care services (one claim per service, per patient) even a small health care 
provider will submit thousands of claims each year.”). See also Timothy 
Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the 
Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 259 
(describing “a steady stream of small claims, resulting, in the aggregate, in 
enormous volumes of claims”). 
54 See Bucy, supra note 34, at 38 (“[A]lthough the total amount of loss per 
fraud scheme may be large, health care fraud usually is committed in small 
dollar increments ($2 per claim form, for example).”). 
55 See Jost & Davies, supra note 53, at 260 (“Even if individually quite 
small . . . astronomical sums are quickly reached.”). 
56 111 F.3d 934, 936 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
57 Id. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit upheld FCA liability on a theory of 
“reckless disregard,” but remanded for a variety of evidentiary issues pertaining 
to the calculation of damages and penalties. Id. at 943. The appeals in the case 
continued through 1999, at which time the D.C. Circuit noted, “It is time for the 
parties to stop refighting battles long-ago lost and for the district court to bring 
this prosecution to an expeditious close.” United States v. Krizek, 192 F.3d 
1024, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
58 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2003) (setting forth grounds for exclusion from 
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component of the government’s war against health care fraud. 
One reason the FCA has been so successful is the law’s qui tam 
provisions, which permit private “relators” who sue on the 
government’s behalf to retain 15 to 30 percent of the proceeds of 
the suit—creating a powerful incentive for private parties to police 
their neighbors in the health care market.59 Since amendments in 
1986 modernized the Act and made it more lucrative to pursue qui 
tam actions, the number of health care-related FCA suits has  
grown exponentially.60 By 1998, nearly two-thirds of the qui tam 
suits filed concerned the federal health care programs, compared to 
only 12 percent in 1987.61 This powerful civil law can thus be 
invoked not only by federal prosecutors, but also by competitors, 
employees, and even patients and their families—making the FCA 
a significant threat to health care providers who receive payment 
from federal health care programs. 
Traditionally, health care FCA cases have involved 
misrepresentation of the facts surrounding the services for which 
payment is requested, such as the submission of claims for services 
that were never rendered.62 Still unanswered is the question of 
whether the FCA can be used as a vehicle for suits alleging 
violations of other federal health care program requirements. 
Recently, prosecutors and qui tam relators have invoked the law in 
situations where health care services were in fact delivered to 
patients, but where the claimants may have violated underlying 
legal requirements (such as the federal anti-referral laws) in 
 
 
federal health care programs); Krause, supra note 49, at 202-12 (discussing FCA 
settlements). See also Joan H. Krause, “Promises to Keep”: Health Care 
Providers and the Civil False Claims Act, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1363 (2002) 
[hereinafter Krause, “Promises to Keep”]. 
59 See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b), (d) (2003) (noting that a private person who 
brings a civil action may potentially receive 15 to 30 percent of the proceeds, 
depending on factors such as whether the government joins in the suit). 
60 See False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100  
Stat. 3153 (1986). 
61 See Fried Frank Harris Shriver & Jacobson, FCA Statistics, at 
http://www.ffhsj.com/quitam/fcastats.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). 
62 See, e.g., Peterson v. Weinberger, 508 F.2d 45, 47-48 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(imposing liability on a physician who billed Medicare for physical therapy 
services that had not been performed). 
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furnishing the care.63 Although few court opinions address the 
merits of such suits, these arguments have been quite successful at 
generating settlements.64 
 
B. Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute 
 
The Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute is the major 
federal law affecting financial relationships within the health care 
market.65 The statute prohibits offering, paying, soliciting, or 
receiving any “remuneration” to induce someone to refer patients 
to any facility, or to purchase, lease, or order any item or service, 
for which payment may be made by a federal health care 
program.66 Unlike the FCA, the Anti-Kickback Statute is a 
criminal law specifically targeting improper activities involving 
health care items and services.67 This broadly-drawn statute 
governs a wide range of financial relationships, including those 
among health care providers, between health care providers and 
their patients, and between health care providers and the 
manufacturers/suppliers from whom they purchase health care 
products. At core, the statute seeks to limit the influence of 
financial incentives over health care decisions, demanding that 
such decisions be made solely on the basis of which products and 
services will best serve the interests of the patient, rather than the 
provider.68 
 
 
63 See Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at  1391-1406 
(discussing health care FCA cases). 
64 See id. at 1404; infra Part III.C.2.a. 
65 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2003). 
66 Id. 
67 Id. § 1320a-7(b) (specifying criminal penalties). 
68 See, e.g., Thomas N. Bulleit, Jr. & Joan H. Krause, Kickbacks,  
Courtesies, or Cost-Effectiveness?: Application of the Medicare Antikickback 
Law to the Marketing and Promotional Practices of Drug and Medical Device 
Manufacturers, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 279, 282 (1999) (“The main purpose of 
the antikickback law may be summarized most succinctly as preventing 
inappropriate financial considerations from influencing the amount, type, cost, 
or selection of the provider of medical care received by a federal health care 
program beneficiary.”); Medicare and Medicare Programs: Fraud and Abuse; 
OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 54 Fed. Reg. 3,088, 3,089 (proposed Jan. 23, 
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More specifically, the statute prohibits: (1) the knowing and 
willful; (2) offer or payment (or solicitation or receipt); (3) of any 
form of remuneration; (4) to induce someone to refer patients or to 
purchase, order, or recommend; (5) any item or service that may be 
paid for under a federal health care program.69 Several aspects of 
this definition require elaboration. First, because the statute 
prohibits both the offer/payment and the solicitation/receipt of 
remuneration, both parties to an improper transaction are subject to 
prosecution (provided, of course, they have the requisite intent). 
Second, the definition of “remuneration” is quite broad, 
incorporating payment made “directly or indirectly, overtly or 
covertly, in cash or in kind.”70 As such, the prohibition extends 
beyond simple kickbacks and bribes to reach not only the exchange 
of money, but anything of value or any type of benefit offered to 
the referring party, including relieving that party of a financial 
burden she would otherwise have to bear.71 
Third, the concept of intent is key to understanding the statute. 
Unfortunately, intent has been used to refer to two similar yet 
distinct concepts in Anti-Kickback jurisprudence. The first is the 
general motivation behind the questionable financial relationship— 
whether it was designed to induce the referral of patients or the 
purchase of items or services. In this respect, the law has been 
interpreted quite broadly to encompass situations in which even 
one purpose of the remuneration—rather than the sole or primary 
purpose—is to induce prohibited referrals.72 Recognizing that few 
 
 
1989) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) (“[I]t is necessary for the fiscal 
integrity of the Medicare and Medicaid programs to assure that physicians 
exercise sound, objective medical judgment when controlling admittance to this 
market.”). 
69 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b). 
70 Id. §§ 1320a-7b(b)(1) & (2). 
71 See, e.g., Medicare and Medicare Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti- 
Kickback Provisions, 54 Fed. Reg. at 3,090 (describing abusive rental schemes). 
72 See, e.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823, 835 (10th Cir. 
2000) (“[A] person who offers or pays remuneration to another person violates 
the Act so long as one purpose of the offer or payment is to induce Medicare or 
Medicaid patient referrals.”); United States v. Greber, 760 F.3d 68, 72 (3d Cir. 
1985) (“If the payments were intended to induce the physician to use 
[defendant’s] services, the statute was violated, even if the payments were also 
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transactions are entered into without at least some contemplation of 
business advantage, however, the Tenth Circuit recently 
acknowledged that “a hospital or individual may lawfully enter 
into a business relationship with a doctor and even hope for or 
expect referrals from the doctor, as long as the hospital is 
motivated to enter into the relationship for legal reasons entirely 
distinct from its collateral hope for referrals.”73 Whether it will be 
feasible to parse the parties’ motivations in such a detailed manner 
remains to be seen. 
The second meaning of intent tracks the traditional criminal 
law definition of mens rea: did the parties make or receive the 
improper payments with the requisite “knowing and willful” state 
of mind?74 In Hanlester Network v. Shalala, the Ninth Circuit held 
that a violation of the statute could not be found unless the 
defendant both knew that the law prohibited giving or receiving 
remuneration in return for referrals and acted with the specific 
intent to violate the statute.75 Although this narrow interpretation 
was heartening to the health care industry, it remains confined to 
those parties falling within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Courts 
in other circuits have declined to adopt such a stringent intent 
standard, finding that the Anti-Kickback Statute is not the sort of 
“highly technical . . . regulation that poses a danger of ensnaring 
persons engaged in apparently innocent conduct,” for which 
 
 
 
intended to compensate for professional services.”). 
73 McClatchey, 217 F.3d at 834. The court, however, gave no indication of 
how to separate the parties’ collateral hopes and expectations from their 
“purpose” in such situations. See also United States v. Bay State Ambulance & 
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20, 30 (1st Cir. 1989) (approving a jury 
instruction that prohibited conviction if the improper purpose was “incidental” 
or “minor”). 
74 Mens rea is defined as “[t]he state of mind that the prosecution, to secure 
a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; 
criminal intent or recklessness.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1999 (7th ed. 
1999). 
75 51 F.3d 1390, 1400 (9th Cir. 1995) (relying on Ratzlaf v. United States, 
510 U.S. 135 (1994), in which the Supreme Court addressed willfulness in the 
context of the prohibition against structuring financial transactions to avoid 
currency reporting requirements, 31 U.S.C. § 5322). 
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specific intent is appropriate.76 At present, then, the applicable 
mens rea standard will vary depending on the jurisdiction in which 
the action is brought. 
Finally, it is important to remember that the statute applies to 
referrals made in connection with beneficiaries of any of the 
federal health care programs.77 For many years the prohibition 
applied only to Medicare and Medicaid patients, leaving an 
apparent loophole for improper behavior in other federally-funded 
programs.78 As of January 1, 1997, however, the prohibition is 
applicable to all federal health care programs other than the 
Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).79 While a 
case involving significant monetary damage to the federal health 
care programs may present a particularly attractive target for 
federal prosecutors, no actual payment by the government is 
required; the mere potential for increased costs will suffice.80 
Penalties for violating the statute are severe, consisting of both 
criminal and civil/administrative sanctions: violation of the statute 
is a felony, punishable by up to five years in prison and/or a fine of 
 
 
 
76 United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833, 838 (11th Cir. 1998) (paraphrasing 
Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1946 (1998)). See also United States v. 
Jain, 93 F.3d 436 (8th Cir. 1996) (requiring proof that the defendant “knew that 
his conduct was wrongful, rather than proof that he knew it violated a known 
legal duty”). For a general discussion of these issues, see Timothy J. Aspinwall, 
The Anti-Kickback Statute Standard(s) of Intent: The Case for a Rule of Reason 
Analysis, 9 ANNALS HEALTH L. 155 (2000); Sharon L. Davies, The 
Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable Ignorance, 48 
DUKE L.J. 341 (1998). 
77 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7-b(b) (2003). 
78 See Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 
191, § 204, 110 Stat. 1936, 1999 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2003)). 
79 Id. The FEHBP, the health insurance program for federal employees, is 
likely excluded for two reasons: (1) it is an employment benefit program, rather 
than a social welfare or entitlement program; and (2) it is administered by the 
Office of Personnel Management, rather than by HHS. See 5 C.F.R. § 890 
(2003). 
80 See, e.g., United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 (7th Cir. 1980) 
(“The potential for increased costs if such . . . agreements become an established 
and accepted method of business is clearly an evil with which the court was 
concerned and one Congress sought to avoid in enacting [the statute].”). 
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up to $25,000.81 Upon conviction, the defendant is subject to 
exclusion from all federal health care programs, a potentially fatal 
blow for entities that derive substantial revenues from such 
business.82 In lieu of a criminal prosecution, the OIG may also  
seek “permissive” exclusion of the provider.83 Prior to being 
excluded, the provider will receive notice and an opportunity to 
request a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ).84 
Although the provider has the right to an attorney, to discovery, 
and to present evidence on its behalf, the administrative hearing is 
not identical to a trial and the ALJ is not bound by the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.85 Thus, one of the most severe penalties 
available for violating the statute—exclusion from all federal 
health care programs—can be imposed without a full-fledged civil 
or criminal proceeding. 
Prior to the late 1990s, the OIG had indicated that it would not 
seek to exclude entities who were not paid directly by the federal 
health care programs, such as drug manufacturers who sell their 
products to physicians and pharmacists (who may in turn submit 
claims for reimbursement).86 In 1998, however, the OIG reversed 
course and issued regulations permitting the exclusion of entities 
that “indirectly furnish” items and services to federal health care 
program beneficiaries.87 Because of the potential for exclusion—as 
 
 
81 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. 
82 The OIG must exclude individuals and entities convicted of a felony 
related to health care fraud, and may exclude them for  misdemeanor 
convictions. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a). 
83 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b)(7) (permitting the exclusion of “[a]ny individual 
or entity that the Secretary determines has committed an act which is described 
in section . . . 1128B . . .”); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.951 (2003) (permitting exclusion 
in limited circumstances). 
84 42 C.F.R. § 1001 (2003). 
85 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 1005.3 (2003) (rights of parties), 1005.17 (evidence), & 
1005.21 (appeals). 
86 See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Amendments to OIG 
Exclusion and CMP Authorities Resulting from Public Law 100-93, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 3298, 3300 (Jan. 29, 1992) (declining to invoke the exclusion authority 
against manufacturers). 
87 See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Revised OIG Exclusion 
Authorities Resulting from Public Law 104-191, 63 Fed. Reg. 46,676 (Sept. 2, 
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well as civil and criminal sanctions—it is fair to say that the Anti- 
Kickback Statute now poses a significantly stronger threat to drug 
manufacturers than in the past. 
Violations of the statute are also punishable by civil and 
administrative monetary sanctions.88 The government has the 
authority to impose a civil monetary penalty (CMP) for violation 
of the statute in the amount of $50,000 for each violation, plus not 
more than three times the remuneration involved.89 In theory, this 
provision has the potential to dwarf even the FCA provisions, 
under which penalties presently are limited to $11,000 per 
violation.90 In reality, however, this relatively new CMP has not 
often been invoked. 
As noted above, some courts have now permitted qui tam 
actions under the FCA based on allegations that the defendant 
violated the Anti-Kickback Statute.91 In United States ex rel. 
Pogue v. American Healthcorp. Inc., for example, a relator alleged 
that the defendant hospitals and physicians had submitted claims 
for services furnished pursuant to referrals that violated the 
Medicare & Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute and the Stark Law.92 
The relator argued that because compliance with the anti-referral 
laws was a prerequisite for participation in Medicare and 
Medicaid, any claims submitted in violation of these provisions 
were, by definition, false and fraudulent.93 In other words, the 
relator posited that the defendants were liable because the 
government would not have paid them for their services had it 
 
 
1998) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.10 (2003)). The OIG characterized its 
about-face as a “clarification,” rather than a change in policy. Id. 
88 42 U.S.C. § 1128A(a)(7) (2003) (imposing civil penalty on a person who 
“commits an act described in paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1128B(b)”). 
89 Id. 
90 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9) (2003). 
91 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
92 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1508 (M.D. Tenn. 1996)  (denying  defendants’ 
motion to dismiss). 
93 See id. at 1509. The district court initially rejected the relator’s theory,  
see United States ex. rel. Pogue v. American Healthcorp, Inc., No. 3-94-0515, 
1995 WL 626514 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 14, 1995), but later reconsidered. See 
Pogue, 914 F. Supp. at 1507 (granting motion to reconsider). 
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known of the referrals.94 While this proposition has not been 
accepted by all jurisdictions,95 such cases raise troubling concerns 
for providers—especially to the extent they essentially create a 
private right of action for kickbacks. 
The language of the Anti-Kickback Statute is very broad, as 
have been judicial interpretations of the law. As commentators 
have noted, “[t]he statute has been held applicable to a wide 
variety of financial relationships that are quite different from an 
obvious kickback for a patient referral or a bribe to recommend the 
purchase of specific products or services.”96 Read literally, the 
statute prohibits the transfer of any amount of remuneration to a 
potential referral source—including a hospital or drug company 
offering physicians free pens, paper, or coffee and donuts. 
Intuitively, it may appear that such minor gifts are unlikely to 
influence physician referral practices, and are not worth the time 
and energy required for a successful prosecution.97 The statute 
contains no dollar threshold, though, and the few cases to 
 
 
 
94 914 F. Supp. at 1509. 
95 See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare 
Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting per se approach and limiting 
FCA’s application to situations in which the claimant falsely certifies 
compliance with a condition that is a prerequisite for payment). 
96 Bulleit & Krause, supra note 68, at 283. 
97 But see Mary-Margaret Chren et al., Doctors, Drug Companies,  and 
Gifts, 262 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3448, 3449 (1989) (“Even mundane things . . . can 
have significance when they are gifts—a book is not simply a book if it is used 
to engender a response.”); Ashley Wazana, Physicians and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry: Is a Gift Ever Just a Gift?, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 373, 376 (2000) 
(concluding that there is “an independent association between benefiting from 
sponsored meals and formulary additional requests” for drugs). Although 
prosecutors might appear to be unlikely to pursue such small cases, the OIG 
repeatedly has warned the industry about offering even minimal gifts to referral 
sources. Cf. Notice, Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Offering 
Gifts and Other Inducements to Beneficiaries, 67 Fed. Reg. 55,855 (Aug. 30, 
2002), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/ 
alertsandbulletins/SABGiftsand Inducements.pdf (permitting providers to offer 
beneficiaries “inexpensive gifts” under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a)(5), defined as 
gifts having no more than $10 individual retail value and no more than $50 
annually per patient). 
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recognize a de minimis exception have set the bar extremely low.98 
Thus, while the statute is very good at prohibiting all financial ties 
that might impermissibly influence referral decisions, it is not very 
good at distinguishing truly problematic activities from ones that 
are neutral—or perhaps even beneficial for the industry.99 
Fortunately, Congress has “recognized that the Anti-Kickback 
Statute’s broad language ha[s] the potential for creating confusion 
in the health care industry regarding the legality of many 
commonplace business arrangements.”100 The statute contains 
explicit exceptions for a few categories of activities, including 
discounts and payment to employees.101 Moreover, Congress 
directed the Secretary of HHS to issue regulations exempting 
additional practices from the scope of the law.102 These 
regulations—known as the “safe harbors”—identify “transactions 
that are deemed to pose little or no threat of abuse or to be 
otherwise desirable or legitimate arrangements,” and hence do not 
violate the statute.103 The initial safe harbors were published in 
1991; a second set of exceptions followed in 1992, with significant 
 
 
 
98 See, e.g., Inspector General v. Hanlester Network, Dec. No. 1275 (HHS 
Dept. App. Bd., App. Div., 1991), reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide 
(CCH), 1992-1 Transfer Binder, ¶ 39,566 at 27,763 n.34 (noting that “de 
minimis or very remote forms of remuneration, such as drug samples or 
recruitment lunches, may not be subject to prosecution . . . If the remuneration 
offered is unlikely to affect physician referral decisions, it is probably not 
intended to induce referrals” under the statute). 
99 See Aspinwall, supra note 76, at 182-84 (discussing the need for a rule of 
reason” analysis to prevent the Anti-Kickback Statute from restricting the 
development of innovative cost-effective health care arrangements). 
100 Robert N. Rabecs, Kickbacks as False Claims: The Use of the Civil  
False Claims Act to Prosecute Violations of the Federal Health Care Program’s 
Anti-Kickback Statute, 2001 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DETROIT. C.L. 1, 7 (2001). 
101 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2003) (exempting practices such as 
discounts, employment compensation, and group purchasing organizations from 
the scope of the prohibition). 
102 See Medicare & Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 680, 697-98 (1998). 
103 John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson is Wrong: Misuse of 
the False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 26 
(1999); see generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003) (safe harbor regulations). 
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amendments finalized in 1999.104 Pursuant to HIPAA, the OIG is 
required to solicit recommendations from the public for adding or 
revising the safe harbors on an annual basis.105 
The safe harbors address a variety of common business 
transactions, such as personal services contracts and the lease of 
office space and equipment, as well as such health-care-specific 
activities as the sale of a medical practice and subsidization of 
malpractice insurance.106 As the name suggests, “parties who 
structure their business arrangements to satisfy all the criteria of an 
applicable safe harbor are sheltered from liability under the Anti- 
Kickback Statute.”107 In general, the safe harbor requirements are 
very narrow and do not provide protection for many real-life 
business arrangements.108 Because a statutory violation can be 
proven only if there is sufficient evidence of intent, however, 
arrangements that do not fall within a safe harbor are not 
necessarily illegal.109 
In determining whether to prosecute under the statute, the OIG 
has said that it will look to a variety of factors, including: (a) the 
 
 
104 See Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory 
Exception to the Anti-Kickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud 
and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment 
of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. 
Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud 
and Abuse; Safe Harbors for Protecting Health Plans, 57 Fed. Reg. 52,723 (Nov. 
5, 1992); Medicare & State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti- 
Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952 (July 29, 1991). 
105 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(a). 
106 See generally 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003) (listing the safe harbor 
provisions). 
107 Rabecs, supra note 100, at 7. 
108 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952. While each safe harbor has specific criteria, 
common requirements include: (1) a signed written agreement; (2) a minimum 
one-year term; (3) payment consistent with “fair market value”; and (4) 
compensation set in advance and not dependent on the volume/value of referrals 
or other business between the parties. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d) 
(describing the criteria for personal services and management contracts). 
109 See Medicare and State Health Care Programs, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,954 
(stating that the legality of an arrangement will depend upon a fact-specific 
analysis). 
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potential for increased charges or costs to payers, especially the 
government; (b) the potential encouragement of overutilization 
(i.e., the ordering or performance of health care services beyond 
those which are medically necessary); (c) the potential for adverse 
effects on competition; and (d) the intent of the parties.110 As 
discussed below, recent years have seen a proliferation of Anti- 
Kickback guidance in addition to the safe harbors, including 
Advisory Opinions, Special Fraud Alerts, and Special Advisory 
Bulletins.111 
 
C. Limitations on Physician Self-Referrals (“Stark Law”) 
 
Originally introduced by Representative Fortney “Pete” Stark 
as the “Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989,” the so-called 
“Stark Law” was enacted as part of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1989.112 The Stark Law is a civil statute 
designed to prohibit the referral of Medicare and Medicaid patients 
to health care providers with whom the referring physician has a 
financial relationship.113 The statute was enacted in response to 
studies suggesting an unexplained increase in the utilization of 
Medicare laboratory services when the referring physician had a 
financial interest in the laboratory to which the patients were 
referred.114 
The original legislation, which has come to be known as “Stark 
I,” took effect on January 1, 1992, and applied to the referral of 
Medicare patients for clinical laboratory services.115 Several years 
later, as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 
 
 
110 See id. at 35,954, 35,956. 
111 See infra Part III.B. 
112 101 Pub. L. No. 239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989), codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395nn (2003). 
113 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2003). 
114 See Medicare Program: Physician Ownership of, and Referrals to,  
Health Care Entities that Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services, 57 Fed. Reg. 
8,588, 8,589 (proposed May 11, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411) 
(describing studies). 
115 See Pub. L. No. 239, § 6204, 103 Stat. 2106 (specifying the original 
prohibition). 
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(OBRA ‘93), Congress extended the prohibition to Medicaid 
patients and expanded it to include a list of ten additional 
“designated health services”—including inpatient and outpatient 
hospital services, outpatient prescription drugs, physical and 
occupational therapy, and home health servicesas of December 
31, 1994.116 
The Stark Law takes a different approach than the Anti- 
Kickback Statute, which looks for abuses on a case-by-case 
basis.117 Instead, Stark prohibits all patient referrals if a relevant 
financial relationship exists, subject to numerous narrowly drawn 
exceptions.118 In its most basic form, the law prohibits referrals of 
patients for designated health services if the referring physician (or 
an immediate family member) has a “financial relationship” with 
the entity providing the services—a category that includes both 
ownership/investment and compensation relationships.119 An entity 
that provides such designated health services may not bill anyone 
for services furnished as a result of a prohibited referral.120 To the 
extent it contains no intent requirement, the law is in essence a 
strict liability prohibition. 
The relevant definitions under the statute are correspondingly 
broad.121 Most notably, the compensation arrangements that trigger 
the prohibition include any arrangement involving any 
remuneration—directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash 
and in kind—between the physician (or an immediate family 
member) and the health care entity.122 Ownership and investment 
interests include those held in equity, debt, or by any other 
means.123 Prohibited referrals include (a) the request or 
 
 
116 See Pub. L. No. 103-66, §§ 13562 & 13624, 107 Stat. 31 (1993). The 
other designated health services are radiology, radiation therapy, durable 
medical equipment, parenteral and enteral nutrients, and prosthetics/orthotics. 42 
U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6). 
117 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2003). 
118 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(a)-(e). 
119 Id. § 1395nn(a) (general prohibition). 
120 Id. 
121 Id. § 1395nn(h). 
122 Id. § 1395nn(h)(1). 
123 Id. § 1395nn(a)(1). To further complicate things, HHS interprets these 
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establishment by a physician of a plan of care that includes the 
provision of designated health services, and (b) the request by a 
physician for an item or service for which payment may be made 
under Medicare Part B, including a request for consultation with 
another physician as well as any test or procedure ordered by, or 
performed by or under the supervision of, the consulting 
physician.124 
Unlike the Anti-Kickback Statute, the Stark Law is not a 
criminal statute and is not punishable by imprisonment. From the 
perspective of health care providers, however, the consequences 
may be nearly as dire. The statute prohibits payment for a 
designated health service furnished pursuant to a prohibited 
referral: claims for such services will be denied, and any payments 
erroneously received must be refunded.125 Moreover, any person 
who knowingly submits or causes a bill to be submitted for 
prohibited services is subject to a civil monetary penalty of up to 
$15,000 for each such service.126 If those provisions are not 
onerous enough, violation of Stark also constitutes grounds for 
exclusion from the federal health care programs—the equivalent of 
a financial “death penalty” for many health care providers.127 
The harshness of the Stark prohibition is mitigated, to a certain 
extent, by numerous statutory exceptions.128 Yet here, too, the law 
is stricter than the Anti-Kickback Statute: because there is no intent 
requirement, the law is violated unless all the criteria for an 
 
 
 
 
definitions to apply to “indirect” as well as “direct” financial relationships. See 
42 C.F.R. § 411.354 (2003). 
124 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(5). 
125 Id. § 1395nn(g)(1)-(2). 
126 Id. §§ 1395nn(g)(3) (per-service penalty) & (g)(4) (imposing a penalty  
of up to $100,000 for an “arrangement or scheme” designed to circumvent the 
prohibition). 
127 Id. § 1395nn(g)(3)-(4) (referencing exclusion provisions in 42 U.S.C. § 
1320a-7). For a discussion of the ways in which such civil actions can be 
considered to have a “punitive” effect, see generally, Kenneth Mann, Punitive 
Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1795 (1992). 
128 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)-(e). 
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exception are met.129 The exceptions are divided into three 
categories: (1) general exceptions, which apply to both ownership 
and compensation arrangements; (2) exceptions relating only to 
ownership or investment interests; and (3) exceptions relating to 
compensation arrangements.130 General exceptions include such 
things as ancillary services provided in a physician’s office (such 
as an in-office laboratory) or services provided by another 
physician in the referring physician’s group practice.131 Exceptions 
applicable to ownership/investment interests include the types of 
investments that might be made by a layperson, such as the 
purchase of publicly traded securities or mutual funds.132 Not 
surprisingly, the exceptions applicable to compensation 
arrangements include a number of common business practices, 
many of which have corresponding Anti-Kickback safe harbors 
(such as the rental of office space or equipment, bona fide 
employment, and personal services arrangements).133 
As described below, a great deal of uncertainty continues to 
surround the status of the Stark II regulations, which have yet to be 
completed.134 Moreover, issues similar to those under the Anti- 
Kickback Statute have arisen regarding the propriety of using 
alleged Stark Law violations as the basis for suits under the 
FCA.135 In fact, the majority of alleged Stark Law violations thus 
 
 
129 Id. 
130 Id. Additional exceptions were added by the regulations. See 42 C.F.R. 
§§ 411.355, 411.357 (2003). 
131 Id. § 1395nn(b)(1)-(2); 42 C.F.R. § 411.355. For both exceptions, the 
physician group must meet the complicated definition of a “group practice.” Id. 
§ 1395nn(h)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 411.352. 
132 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(c); 42 C.F.R. § 411.356. 
133 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(e); 42 C.F.R. § 411.357 (adding new exceptions). 
134 “Phase I” of the regulations was published in January 2001 and took 
effect (with minor exceptions) in January 2002. As of December 2003, however, 
CMS had yet to publish “Phase II” of the regulations, which will address 
additional exceptions, sanctions, and reporting requirements. See Medicare 
Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have 
Financial Relationships, 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 4, 2001) (codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pts. 411 & 424 (2003)). See also infra Part II.A. 
135 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text; United States ex rel. 
Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 900-01 (5th Cir. 
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far have been brought via qui tam suits, rather than as direct 
enforcement of the statute by HHS.136 
 
III. CURRENT THEMES IN FRAUD AND ABUSE 
 
With that brief overview, this article now turns to a discussion 
of current federal efforts to eliminate health care fraud and abuse. 
Recent scholarship provides a variety of perspectives on these 
efforts. Some commentators decry the expanded use of the fraud 
laws, arguing that recent initiatives are unfair and ultimately will 
work to the detriment of both providers and patients.137 While 
acknowledging that minor adjustments may be necessary, other 
commentators stress that “fraud and abuse is morally wrong and 
fiscally harmful,” and praise recent enforcement innovations.138 
The debate—in part practical, in part theoretical—shows few signs 
of abating.139 
 
 
1997) (addressing an FCA suit based on alleged Stark and Anti-Kickback 
violations). 
136 See, e.g., Robert Salcido, The Government Unleashes the Stark Law to 
Enforce the False Claims Act: The Implications of the Government’s Theory for 
the Future of False Claims Act Enforcement, 13 No. 5 HEALTH LAW, Aug.  
2001, at 1 (describing cases); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department 
Announces Settlements with South Dakota Hospital and Doctors for $6,525,000, 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002/December002_civ_739. htm (Dec. 20, 
2002) (announcing settlement of Stark-based qui tam suit against South Dakota 
hospital). 
137 See, e.g., Boese & McLain, supra note 103, at 55 (arguing that the 
Thompson decision “perpetuated a regime in which health care providers are 
subjected to a degree of uncertainty that undermines the bedrock principles of 
the rule of law”); Krause, supra note 49, at 212 (arguing that widespread 
provider perception that the laws are being used unfairly may jeopardize the 
legitimacy of the anti-fraud agenda); Dayna Bowen Matthew, An Economic 
Model to Analyze the Impact of False Claims Act Cases on Access to Healthcare 
for the Elderly, Disabled, Rural and Inner-City Poor, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 439, 
467 (2001) (arguing that false certification cases are “flawed tools . . . likely to 
have a disproportionately negative impact on the availability of healthcare to the 
poor”). 
138 Jost & Davies, supra note 53, at 318 (arguing that only “targeted 
corrections” are needed). 
139 See Hyman, supra note 1, at 174 (noting that assessment of whether 
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Rather than adopting one of these viewpoints, the tripartite 
conceptual model addressed here focuses instead on the 
mechanisms by which government officials communicate with the 
provider community about permissible behaviors. Currently, such 
communications take the form of regulation, information, and 
litigation. Despite the fact that only properly promulgated 
regulations are legally binding, health care fraud efforts 
increasingly have followed the latter two approaches. On the 
positive side, this development offers increased guidance to health 
care providers as to the scope of their permissible business 
activities. At the same time, however, it raises the possibility that 
providers may be subjected not only to additional—but perhaps 
also to inconsistent—legal interpretations from these varied 
sources. 
 
A. Regulation 
 
By regulation, I mean the development of official, binding 
guidance through traditional notice-and-comment procedures in 
accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).140 The 
APA requires an agency such as HHS to provide notice and an 
opportunity for public comment regarding all proposed “rule 
makings.”141 The Social Security Act reiterates this requirement  
for the Medicare program, providing that “[n]o rule, requirement, 
or other statement of policy . . . that establishes or changes a 
substantive legal standard governing the scope of benefits [or] the 
payment for services shall take effect unless” properly 
promulgated by the Secretary of HHS.142 
Notice-and-comment rulemaking has a long history in the 
health care context, particularly under the Anti-Kickback Statute. 
The Statute itself contains several exceptions, and Congress 
 
 
current efforts “mark[] a step in the right direction” depends on a number of 
“preexisting assumptions regarding the frequency and severity of the problem”). 
140 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2003). 
141 Id. § 553. A “rule” is defined as “the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to 
implement, interpret, or prescribe law or policy.” Id. § 551(4). 
142 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2003). 
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directed the Secretary of HHS to develop additional “safe harbor” 
regulations exempting additional practices from the scope of the 
law.143 Although the basic contours of the safe harbors were 
established by the early 1990s, notice-and-comment rulemaking 
continues to play a key role in their development. As the OIG 
recently stated, “Congress intended the safe harbor regulations to 
be evolving rules that would be updated periodically to reflect 
changing business practices and technologies in the health care 
industry.”144 
For example, HIPAA explicitly required HHS to engage in a 
negotiated rulemaking process to develop a new exception for risk- 
sharing arrangements, such as those commonly found in managed 
care.145 HIPAA similarly invoked the traditional APA process by 
requiring the Secretary of HHS to publish an annual notice 
soliciting proposals for new and revised safe harbors, with the 
resulting amendments to be made through notice-and-comment 
procedures.146 Most recently, this procedure was used to develop a 
new safe harbor exempting health care facilities from liability for 
restocking certain ambulance supplies used in transporting 
 
 
143 See 42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(3) (2003) (exempting practices such as 
discounts, employment compensation, and group purchasing organizations from 
the scope of the prohibition); Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program 
Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-93, § 14, 101 Stat. 697-98 (requiring 
development of safe harbors); 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (listing current safe harbor 
provisions). 
144 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe 
Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute for Waiver of Beneficiary Coinsurance 
and Deductible Amounts, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,202, 60,203 (proposed Sept. 25, 
2002) (to be codified 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001). 
145 See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 216, 110 Stat. 1936, 2007-8 (1996). The 
resulting safe harbors were published in November 1999, along with revisions to 
a number of the existing regulations. See Medicare and State Health Care 
Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory Exception to the Anti-Kickback Statute 
for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 
42 C.F.R. § 100.952(t) & (u) (2003)) (finalizing risk sharing safe harbors); 
Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the 
Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor 
Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 
1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2003)) (amending safe harbors). 
146 See Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 205, 110 Stat. 1936, 2000-01 (1996). 
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patients.147 
For a long time, the traditional notice-and-comment process 
was virtually the only way for health care providers to obtain 
guidance from the government on how to interpret the fraud laws. 
As a result, attorneys pored over the lengthy preamble to each 
Federal Register notice, trying to glean some nugget of regulatory 
intent to help decipher the complicated language of the law and 
regulations. The government was not blind to this phenomenon, 
and the agencies artfully used the notices to convey information 
that was not explicitly contained in the regulations themselves— 
such as the factors that would be taken into account in determining 
whether to pursue a particular Anti-Kickback allegation.148 
Over time, however, it became abundantly clear that the 
traditional regulatory process was too cumbersome to respond to 
the practical realities of the complex health care market. This 
observation is by no means limited to health care; the 
administrative law literature is replete with examples of the 
“ossification” of the formal rulemaking process.149 In the health 
care fraud context, however, this phenomenon denies providers the 
immediate guidance they need to determine the legality of many 
 
 
147 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse;  
Ambulance Replenishing Safe Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 66 Fed. 
Reg. 62,979 (Dec. 4, 2001), codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(v) (2003). 
148 See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG 
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,954 (July 29, 1991) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2003)) (listing factors); Lewis Morris & Gary 
W. Thompson, Reflections on the Government’s Stick and Carrot Approach to 
Fighting Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 352 (1999) (reiterating the 
aspects of an Anti-Kickback inquiry). 
149 See, e.g., Jody Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the  
Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11-14 (1997) (describing the 
disadvantages of the traditional agency rulemaking process); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE 
L. J. 1385 (1992) (describing how rulemaking “has become increasingly rigid 
and burdensome”); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification: Rethinking 
Recent Proposals to Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment 
Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483 (1997) (defining ossification as “the 
inefficiencies that plague regulatory programs because of analytic hurdles that 
agencies must clear in order to adopt new rules”). 
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commonplace business transactions. In particular, the time lag 
between a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the issuance of a 
Final Rule raises the possibility that industry practice—and the law 
itself—may change significantly in the interim. As but one 
example, the OIG proposed several new Anti-Kickback safe 
harbors in 1993, and proposed to amend a number of the existing 
safe harbors in 1994.150 The amendments were not finalized, 
however, until after the Clinton Health Plan debates had resulted in 
the enactment of HIPAA—which created a new statutory 
exception and required the development of additional safe harbors 
concerning risk sharing arrangements.151 
Similarly, the dynamic nature of the health care market and the 
innovative ways in which health care providers seek to adjust to 
changing market conditions create a situation in which the official 
regulations always seem to be one step behind industry practice. 
Due to the pace of health care innovation—as well as the existence 
of a few entrepreneurial providers who seek to “game” the 
increasingly complex system—the financial arrangements 
regarding health care (and the attendant forms of fraud) essentially 
are moving targets.152 The OIG has acknowledged this, noting, 
 
 
150 See Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Additional Safe Harbor 
Provisions Under the OIG Anti-Kickback Statute, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,008 
(proposed Sept. 21, 1993) (to be codified at 42. C.F.R. § 1001.952) (proposing 
seven additional safe harbors); Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud 
and Abuse; Clarification of the OIG Safe Harbor Anti-Kickback Provisions, 59 
Fed. Reg. 37,202 (proposed July 21, 1994) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 
1001.952) (proposing revisions to safe harbors). 
151 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104- 
191, § 204, 110 Stat. 1936. Final revisions were not published until November 
1999. See Federal Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Statutory Exception 
to the Anti-Kickback Statute for Shared Risk Arrangements, 64 Fed. Reg. 
63,504 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003)); Medicare and 
State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial OIG 
Safe Harbor Provisions and Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions 
Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64 Fed. Reg. 63,518 (Nov. 19, 1999) (codified 
at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2003)). 
152 “Gaming the system” refers to “an artificial restructuring  of  
employment or social relationships to maximize individual benefits.” Edward G. 
Grossman, Comparing the Options for Universal Coverage, HEALTH AFF., 
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“Congress intended the safe harbor regulations to be evolving rules 
to reflect changing business practices and technologies in the 
health care industry.”153 Although health care fraud regulations are 
designed to provide flexibility, by necessity they are based on a 
loose snapshot of industry practice at a single point in time. 
Enshrining such practices in law not only risks the creation of 
regulations that are outdated from the moment of creation, but also 
raises the possibility of freezing the industry at a sub-optimal point 
in time. As a result, according to Professor James Blumstein, 
current health care fraud enforcement is analogous to a 
“speakeasy,” where “conduct that is illegal is rampant and 
countenanced by law enforcement officials because the law is so 
out of sync with the conventional norms and realities of the 
marketplace.”154 
Perhaps no topic illustrates the perils of health care fraud 
regulation as much as the ongoing saga of the Stark Law. As 
described above, the current law is derived from two different 
pieces of legislation: (1) an initial prohibition on physician self- 
referrals of Medicare patients for clinical laboratory services, 
which took effect on January 1, 1992; and (2) the OBRA ‘93 
expansion covering additional categories of designated health 
services, which took effect as of December 31, 1994.155 By 
December 2003, however, the Stark II regulations had yet to be 
completed. 
The initial regulations implementing the Stark I prohibitions 
 
 
 
 
Spring (II) 1994, at 86. In the health care context, for example, “physicians may 
attempt to game the system so as to evade cost control measures” that might 
reduce their revenue. Arti K. Rai, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: A Tale of 
Behavior Induced by Payment Structure, 30 J. LEG. STUD. 579 (2001). 
153 Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; Safe 
Harbor Under the Anti-Kickback Statute for Waiver of Beneficiary Coinsurance 
and Deductible Amounts, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,202, 60,203 (proposed Sept. 25, 
2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952). 
154 James F. Blumstein, The Fraud and Abuse Statute in an  Evolving  
Health Care Marketplace: Life in the Health Care Speakeasy, 22 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 205, 218 (1996). 
155 See supra Part II.C. 
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were proposed in the spring of 1992.156 The proposal resulted in 
the submission of almost three hundred comments to the Health 
Care Financing Administration (HCFA, now renamed the Centers 
for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)).157 As a result, the 
final rule was not published until August of 1995—three years 
after the original law went into effect, and eight months after the 
expanded Stark II provisions had become effective.158 While 
indicating its intention to publish a separate notice of proposed 
rulemaking for Stark II, HCFA stated: 
[W]e believe that a majority of our interpretations in this 
final rule with comment will apply to the other designated 
health services. Until we publish a rule covering the 
designated health services, we intend to rely on our 
language and interpretation in this final rule when 
reviewing referrals for the designated health services in 
appropriate cases.159 
In the interim, health care lawyers were forced to improvise, 
offering their best guesses as to the meaning of the Stark II 
provisions based on the broad statutory language and extrapolating 
from analogous, but not identical, Stark I regulations. 
And a long interim it turned out to be. After two and a half 
years of uncertainty, proposed Stark II regulations were published 
in January of 1998.160 Far from clarifying the prohibitions, 
 
 
156 See Medicare Program: Physician Ownership of, and Referrals to,  
Health Care Entities That Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services, 57 Fed. Reg. 
8,588 (proposed Mar. 11, 1992) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 411). An interim 
final rule concerning only Stark I reporting requirements was published in 
December of 1991. Medicare Program; Reporting Requirements for Financial 
Relationships Between Physicians and Health Care Entities that Furnish 
Selected Items and Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 61,374 (Dec. 3, 1991) (codified at 42 
C.F.R. § 411.361 (2003)). 
157 Medicare Program: Physician Ownership of, and Referrals to, Health 
Care Entities That Furnish Clinical Laboratory Services and Financial 
Relationship Reporting Requirements, 60 Fed. Reg. 41,914 (Aug. 14, 1995) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. § 411.350 (2003)). 
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 41,916. 
160 Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care 
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however, the proposal proved to be exceedingly controversial, in 
large part because some of the provisions went beyond what the 
statute required (or perhaps allowed).161 The rule included a 
number of new exceptions to the self-referral ban and proposed 
significant revisions to components of the key group practice 
definition, leading one group of attorneys to conclude that the 
proposal “raise[s] as many questions as it answers.”162 
Once again, any hope of a speedy resolution to these questions 
was dashed. A “final” Stark II rule was published in January of 
2001, three years after the proposed rule and a full six years after 
the revised law went into effect.163 Despite filling 110 pages of the 
Federal Register, however, the Stark saga was by no means 
over.164 Instead, HCFA indicated that the regulations merely 
comprised Phase I of the final regulations, addressing the basic 
Stark II prohibition, definitions, and general exceptions; a 
subsequent “Phase II” rule would be needed to address the 
remaining provisions of the statute, including additional 
exceptions, reporting requirements, and sanctions.165 Moreover, 
HCFA delayed the effective date of the regulations for a year to 
allow time for providers to comment and comply with the new 
requirements.166 
Health care providers were not amused. A prominent group of 
 
 
Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationships, 63 Fed. Reg. 1,659 
(proposed Jan. 9, 1998) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411, 424, 435 & 455). 
161 See, e.g., Id. at 1,682 (refusing to exclude lithotripsy from the definition 
of “inpatient hospital services” despite requests to do so). This decision was  
later held to be erroneous. Am. Lithotripsy Soc’y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp. 2d 
23 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that inclusion was contrary to congressional intent). 
162  Self-Referral: HCFA Issues Proposed Rule Governing Physician Stark  
II Referrals, 2 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 7 (Jan. 1, 1998) (quoting a 
statement by the law firm of Winston & Strawn). See, e.g., Medicare and 
Medicaid Programs, 63 Fed. Reg. at 1,687-91 (discussing group practices), 
1,699 (discussing the new exception for “de minimis” compensation). 
163 Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care 
Entities with Which They Have Financial Relationships, 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (Jan. 
4, 2001) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 & 424 (2003)). 
164 Id. at 856-965. 
165 Id. at 856, 859-60 (describing phases). 
166 Id. at 859. 
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health care attorneys criticized the one-year delay, “call[ing] the 
rule a ‘virtual’ regulatory event” and deriding HCFA’s “post- 
publication schizophrenia.”167 Nevertheless, providers and their 
attorneys set to work to bring practices into compliance before the 
rule took effect in January 2002. Unfortunately, even the one-year 
delay was marked by problems. Soon after taking office in January 
2001, President Bush postponed for sixty days the effective date of 
any regulations that had not yet gone into effect, generating short- 
lived confusion about the future of the Stark II rule under the new 
Administration.168 In November of 2001, CMS delayed the 
effective date of one provision (the definition of the phrase “set in 
advance” as applied to percentage compensation arrangements) yet 
again, in order to give the agency time to reconsider its 
approach.169 When the rule finally went into effect in January 
2002, it inadvertently contained minor errors that CMS had 
intended to repeal, which will require further revisions to the Phase 
 
 
 
167 Self-Referral: Stark II “Virtual” Final Regulations Reflect HCFA 
“Schizophrenia,” Attorneys Say, 5 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 257 (Mar. 
21, 2001) (describing comments contained in a briefing by the American Health 
Lawyers Association). 
168 Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care 
Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships: Delay of Effective 
Date of Final Rule and Technical Amendment, 66 Fed. Reg. 8771 (Feb. 2, 2001) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 411 & 424 (2003)). Despite the initial confusion, 
CMS took the position that the Administration’s action only delayed a discrete 
subsection of the regulations concerning home health agencies, which had been 
scheduled to take effect in February 2001. Id. 
169 Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care 
Entities With Which They Have Financial Relationships: Partial Delay of 
Effective Date, 66 Fed. Reg. 60,154 (Dec. 3, 2001). In November 2002 and 
April 2003, CMS delayed the effective date of this provision for additional six 
month periods “in order to avoid unnecessarily disrupting existing contractual 
arrangements for physician services.” Medicare and Medicaid Programs; 
Physicians’ Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial 
Relationships: Extension of Partial Delay of Effective Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 70,322 
(Nov. 22, 2002). See also Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Physicians’ 
Referrals to Health Care Entities With Which They Have Financial 
Relationships: Extension of Partial Delay of Effective Date, 68 Fed. Reg. 20,347 
(April 25, 2003). 
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I regulations.170 Thus, more than a decade after the enactment of 
the original Stark legislation, health care providers do not yet have 
access to final regulations interpreting the law’s complicated 
prohibition. As one commentator wryly noted, “[a]lthough the 
intent was to provide comprehensive bright line rules, regulators 
have had great difficulty in figuring out where the lines are.”171 
While most health care fraud regulations do not have quite as 
tortured a history as the Stark Law, this saga illustrates that 
traditional regulation can be an extraordinarily cumbersome 
process. In the complicated and constantly evolving arena of health 
care financial relationships, the advantages offered by binding 
regulations, developed after extensive public input, may well be 
outweighed by the necessity of generating more timely forms of 
guidance. 
 
B. Information 
 
Growing concern about the disadvantages of traditional notice- 
and-comment rulemaking led to the development of what I call 
information: the proliferation of sources of health care fraud 
guidance outside the traditional regulatory process. These informal 
forms of guidance are used to convey the agency’s current 
interpretation of the law to the health care community. As former 
HHS Inspector General June Gibbs Brown noted in an Open Letter 
to Health Care Providers, “[t]hrough public awareness efforts . . . 
we alert the provider community of our concerns and hope to 
encourage self-correcting behavior.”172 As described below, 
 
 
170  See Self-Referral: CMS Fails to Remove Portion of Rule Effective Jan.  
4, Despite Earlier Statement, 6 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 9 (Jan. 9, 
2002) (quoting a letter written by a CMS representative acknowledging the 
error). Moreover, a federal district court enjoined implementation of one aspect 
of the definition of “designated health services,” holding that the inclusion of 
lithotripsy in the definition was contrary to congressional intent. Am. Lithotripsy 
Soc’y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp. 2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002). 
171 David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Changes, 
Social Norms, and the Trust “Reposed in the Workmen,” 30 J. LEG. STUD. 531, 
551 (2001) [hereinafter, Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse]. 
172 Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Office of Inspector General, An Open 
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however, the necessity of relying on informal interpretive materials 
can have significant repercussions for health care providers, both 
under administrative law principles and in terms of day-to-day 
practice. 
 
1. Forms of Health Care Fraud Information 
 
Various forms of health care fraud information are now 
available to health care providers, including both statutorily 
mandated advisory processes and informal guidance mechanisms 
developed solely within HHS. While some types of guidance are 
binding on the entities who request the advice, they may not be 
binding on the general public—although judges may nonetheless 
find the agency’s views to be persuasive.173 Among the most 
common forms of fraud guidance are Advisory Opinions, Special 
Fraud Alerts, Compliance Program Guidances, and Special 
Advisory Bulletins. 
 
a. Advisory Opinions 
 
HIPAA required the Secretary of HHS, in consultation with the 
Attorney General, to provide written Advisory Opinions as to 
whether a proposed transaction would, inter alia, violate the Anti- 
Kickback Statute or subject the requestor to civil monetary 
penalties or exclusion.174 Advisory Opinions are thus an example 
 
 
Letter to Health Care Providers (Mar. 9, 2000), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/ 
fraud/docs/openletters/openletter.htm. 
173 See infra notes 208-12 and accompanying text. 
174 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b) (2003); 42 C.F.R. pt. 1008 (2003). The 
original Advisory Opinion mandate expired in August 2000, but was 
permanently reinstated as part of the 2001 appropriations process. See 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 543, 114 Stat. 2763 
(2001). A similar process is required under the Stark Law, although few 
opinions have been issued. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(g)(6) (2003); 42 C.F.R. §§ 
411.370 (2003) et seq. Despite initial concern that Advisory Opinions could  
only be requested for activities already underway, the regulations made clear 
that requests may pertain to activities “which the requestor in good faith plans to 
undertake.” 42 C.F.R. § 1008.15(a) (2003); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1128D(b)(2) 
(2003)  (opinions  are  available  concerning  arrangement/activity  or   proposed 
92 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
of “voluntary preclearance,” a form of intermediate ex ante 
regulatory enforcement.175 Mindful of resource constraints and 
inter-agency conflicts, Congress specified that Advisory Opinions 
could not address whether a transaction involves fair market value 
or whether an individual qualifies as a bona fide employee under 
the Internal Revenue Code.176 While Advisory Opinions are 
binding only as to the Secretary of HHS and the requestor(s), they 
are made available to the public (in redacted form) on the agency’s 
web site.177 Even if third parties are not entitled to rely on the 
conclusions, however, Advisory Opinions nonetheless function as 
valuable sources of information as to the agency’s likely views 
regarding analogous transactions. 
Despite offering a relatively informal mechanism for obtaining 
guidance from the OIG, the Advisory Opinion process remains 
cumbersome.178 Although the OIG is required to issue an Opinion 
within sixty days after accepting a request, that time period is 
tolled by requests for additional information, requests for payment, 
and decisions to seek external expert consultation.179 Moreover, in 
order to obtain an Opinion the requestor must submit “[a] complete 
and specific description of all relevant information bearing on the 
arrangement . . . and on the circumstances of the conduct,” 
including copies of all operative documents for existing 
arrangements, and copies of drafts, model documents, or 
 
 
 
arrangement/activity).  However,  hypothetical  requests  are  not  acceptable. 42 
C.F.R. § 1008.15(b). 
175 Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1289. For a description of similar processes in 
other agencies, see, e.g., id. at 1289-91 (describing various agency practices); 
Spencer Weber Waller, Prosecution by Regulation: The Changing Nature 
Antitrust Enforcement, 77 OR. L. REV. 1383, 1395 (1998) (describing business 
review letters issued by the DOJ Antitrust Division). 
176 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(b)(3). 
177 See id. § 1320a-7d(b)(4); 42 C.F.R. § 1008.53 (identifying affected 
parties). A complete list of advisory opinions is available at http://oig.hhs.gov/ 
fraud/advisoryopinions.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2004). 
178 See Phyllis A. Avery & Andrew B. Wachler, Advisory Opinion 
Regulations Will Discourage Many Potential Requestors, HEALTH LAW., Vol. 9, 
No. 6, at 24 (1997). 
179 42 C.F.R. § 1008.43(c). 
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descriptions of proposed terms for contemplated arrangements.180 
Significant resources thus must be expended to develop the 
information needed to support the request—a request that may well 
result in the abandonment of the transaction.181 In addition, the 
OIG retains the right to rescind, terminate or modify a previous 
Opinion upon reconsideration of the issues involved, although the 
requestor will be given an opportunity to discontinue or modify its 
actions.182 Thus, the advice available through the Advisory 
Opinion process is by no means as timely, easily obtained, or 
reliable as it might first appear. 
 
b. Special Fraud Alerts 
 
The OIG periodically issues Special Fraud Alerts in areas in 
which the agency believes there may be abuse, particularly those 
involving improper referrals under the Anti-Kickback Statute.183 
Rather than setting out discrete tests for liability, Special Fraud 
Alerts merely identify “suspect practices” that may attract 
scrutiny.184 While a health care provider who engages in one of 
 
 
180 Id. § 1008.36(b)(4). 
181 See Scott D. Godshall, Death By Regulation: HHS’s Advisory Opinion 
Guidelines, ANDREWS HEALTH CARE FRAUD LITIG. REP., May 1997, at 3. “In 
other words, regulatory advice—which may kill the deal entirely—is not 
available until the parties have gone through the time and expense of drafting 
and negotiating each of the contracts and agreements necessary to finalize the 
deal . . . In terms of business planning and compliance, a decision to withhold 
regulatory advice until the deal is all but executed is a decision to make the 
advice largely meaningless.” Id. 
182 42 C.F.R. § 1008.45 (explaining procedures for rescission, termination, 
or modification). 
183 See, e.g., Special Fraud Alert: Hospital Incentives to Physicians (May 
1992), reprinted in Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 
65,372, 65,373 (Dec. 19, 1994) (describing Alerts). 
184 See, e.g., id. at 65,375-76 (listing suspect hospital incentives, such as the 
provision of free or significantly discounted items, spaces, or services); Special 
Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug Market Schemes (Aug. 1994), reprinted in id. at 
65,376 (identifying possible improper payments and gifts from drug 
manufacturers, including those offered to physicians in exchange for prescribing 
a manufacturer’s products); Special Fraud Alert: Arrangements for the Provision 
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these suspect practices is not automatically in violation of the law, 
the Fraud Alert serves to put the provider on notice that the 
practice may attract attention. 
Special Fraud Alerts occupy a unique position on the spectrum 
of health care fraud guidance. Unlike the safe harbors or Advisory 
Opinions, there is no explicit legislative authority for the issuance 
of Fraud Alerts; instead, they are an exercise of the agency’s 
general administrative interpretive authority.185 For many years, 
the OIG issued internal fraud alerts “to identify fraudulent and 
abusive practices within the health care industry.”186 In 1989, the 
agency began to issue periodic alerts intended for wider 
publication distribution, explaining: 
[T]he OIG Special Fraud Alerts have served to provide 
general guidance to the health care industry on violations of 
Federal law (including various aspects of the anti-kickback 
statute), as well as to provide additional insight to the 
Medicare carrier fraud units in identifying health care fraud 
schemes.187 
Despite their unofficial status and highly fact-specific nature, the 
OIG has viewed such Alerts quite favorably; indeed, the agency 
offered the Special Fraud Alert mechanism as an alternative to 
adopting an earlier iteration of the Advisory Opinion process.188 
Congress officially recognized the existence of Special Fraud 
Alerts in HIPAA, which created a mechanism for private parties to 
 
 
of Clinical Lab Services (Oct. 1994), reprinted in id., at 65,377-78 (identifying 
problematic inducements by clinical laboratories, including providing free 
services to physicians who generate business for the laboratory). 
185 See infra notes 227-30 and accompanying text (discussing interpretive 
authority). 
186 See Notice, Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. at 
65,373 (describing the history of fraud alerts). 
187 Id. 
188 See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG 
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (July 29, 1991) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001 (2003)) (declining to create an advisory opinion 
process for Anti-Kickback queries, and indicating “that OIG fraud alerts are the 
best mechanism for imparting practical and continuing guidance to individuals 
and entities seeking to avoid violations of the statute”). 
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request that the OIG issue an Alert to “inform the public of 
practices which the [OIG] considers to be suspect or of particular 
concern” under the federal health care programs.189 In recent years, 
Special Fraud Alerts have addressed such topics as nursing home 
arrangements with hospice programs, home health fraud, rental of 
physician office space by entities to which the physician refers 
patients, and physician liability for fraudulent medical equipment 
and home health certifications.190 
 
c. Compliance Program Guidances 
 
One of the most significant recent developments in health care 
fraud and abuse has been the increasing emphasis on corporate 
compliance. Since the mid-1990s, it has become standard practice 
for the OIG and DOJ to require health care providers to enter into 
corporate integrity agreements (CIAs) as a condition of settling 
health care fraud allegations, most often in return for the OIG’s 
agreement not to seek the provider’s exclusion from the federal 
health care programs.191 Although each CIA is tailored to the 
specific conduct at issue, common elements include the 
appointment of a compliance officer, the development of 
compliance training procedures in key areas (such as billing rules), 
the development of confidential mechanisms by which employees 
can report potential violations, and the submission of reports to the 
government documenting the provider’s compliance efforts.192 The 
 
 
189 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d(c) (2003) (permitting such requests). 
190 A complete list of Special Fraud Alerts can be found at 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/fraudalerts.html#1 (last visited July 15, 2002). 
191 See Office of Inspector Gen., Corporate Integrity Agreements: General 
Information, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html#1 (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). As 
the OIG explains, “A provider or entity consents to these obligations as part of 
the civil settlement and in exchange for the OIG’s agreement not to seek an 
exclusion of that health care provider or entity from participation in Medicare, 
Medicaid and other Federal health care programs.” Id. See also Thomas E. 
Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The Brave New World of Health Care 
Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 55 (1997) (explaining CIA 
requirements). 
192 A list of common elements, as well as a list of current CIAs, can be 
found on the OIG’s web site. See http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html#1 (last 
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reporting and oversight provisions are onerous and typically last 
for at least five years.193 
Not surprisingly, the emphasis has moved from compliance as 
a remedy to compliance as a preventive mechanism. The genesis of 
voluntary compliance efforts, resulting in so-called “corporate 
compliance programs,” can be traced to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for Organizations, which went into effect in 1991.194 
The Guidelines permit the court to reduce an organization’s 
culpability score “[i]f the offense occurred despite an effective 
program to prevent and detect violations of the law.”195 An 
effective program requires, at a minimum, that the organization: 
establish, communicate, monitor, and enforce compliance 
standards and procedures for its employees and contractors; assign 
responsibility for compliance to specific high-level personnel; 
refrain from delegating authority to individuals with a history of 
illegal behavior; and take appropriate steps when an offense is 
detected.196 Although the Guidelines only apply to organizations 
convicted of criminal activities, the OIG has indicated that a 
compliance program may also benefit organizations accused of 
violating civil laws—both by preventing some improper activities 
from occurring in the first place and by minimizing the 
organization’s exposure if wrongdoing is detected and reported on 
a timely basis.197 
Rather than requiring each health care provider to create a 
 
 
visited Feb. 14, 2003). 
193 Id. 
194 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (sentencing of 
organizations) (2001); Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 191, at 55 (tracing the 
emphasis on corporate compliance to the Guidelines). 
195 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f). 
196 Id. at § 8A1.1, Commentary 3(k). These provisions also form the basis 
for the common CIA elements noted above. See supra note 192 and 
accompanying text. 
197 See, e.g., Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for 
Hospices, 64 Fed. Reg. 54,031, 54,033 (Oct. 5, 1999) (describing the benefits of 
a compliance program). For details as to when such leniency may be applicable, 
see id. at 54,033 n.5 (referencing sources); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2003) 
(providing that a person who voluntarily discloses a violation of the FCA may 
be subject to double, rather than treble, damages). 
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program anew, the OIG has published a series of “Compliance 
Program Guidances” designed to guide members of a particular 
sector of the health care industry in establishing their own 
voluntary compliance programs.198 While adherence to these 
Guidances are not mandatory (and may not be feasible for smaller 
entities), the documents provide valuable advice as to what the 
OIG believes are the key compliance issues for such providers. As 
the OIG has stated: 
The adoption and implementation of voluntary compliance 
programs significantly advance the prevention of fraud, 
abuse and waste in these health care plans while at the  
same time further the fundamental mission of [the 
providers] . . . . [R]egardless of a [provider’s] size and 
structure, the OIG believes that every [provider] can and 
should strive to accomplish the objectives and principles 
underlying all of the compliance policies and procedures 
recommended within this guidance.199 
The OIG issued a Model Compliance Plan for Clinical 
Laboratories in 1997, following several highly publicized fraud 
settlements involving national laboratory companies.200 By June 
2003, the OIG had issued Compliance Guidances for hospitals, 
clinical laboratories, home health agencies, third-party medical 
billing companies, durable medical equipment suppliers, hospices, 
Medicare+Choice organizations, nursing facilities, individual and 
small group physician practices, pharmaceutical manufacturers, 
 
 
198 See HHS Office of Inspector General, Fraud Prevention and Protection, 
Compliance Guidance, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/ complianceguidance.html 
(last visited Jan. 3, 2004) (listing guidelines). 
199 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Hospices, 64 
Fed. Reg. at 54,032. 
200 See Notice, Publication of the OIG Model Compliance Plan for Clinical 
Laboratories, 62 Fed. Reg. 9,435 (Mar. 3, 1997); United States ex rel. Wagner v. 
Allied Clin. Labs., No. C-1-94-092, 1995 WL 254405 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (settling 
allegations that a laboratory billed for tests not supported by patient diagnoses). 
The model plan was revised in 1998 to better track the format of subsequent 
Guidances. See Notice, Publication of OIG Compliance Program Guidance for 
Clinical Laboratories, 63 Fed. Reg. 45,076 (Aug. 24, 1998) (revising Guidance 
“to refine and build on” the original document). 
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and ambulance companies.201 Thus, a wide range of health care 
providers can consult Guidances directly targeting their practices, 
while many others can argue by analogy from Guidances designed 
for similar entities.202 
 
d. Special Advisory Bulletins 
 
The OIG has also issued several Special Advisory Bulletins, 
which offer additional guidance as to whether health care activities 
will violate federal law.203 Bulletins are similar to Special Fraud 
Alerts in that they address a range of impermissible activities, 
rather than answering specific queries from health care 
providers.204 In other respects, however, the issues addressed in 
Bulletins do not fit the Special Fraud Alert model, in part because 
they concern a wider range of fraud laws. Recent Bulletins have 
addressed the practices of billing consultants, the patient anti- 
dumping statute, the effect of exclusion from the federal health 
care programs, and the offering of gifts and other inducements to 
beneficiaries.205 Although Bulletins are not explicitly authorized by 
law, the OIG typically grounds its authority in HIPAA’s broad 
mandate that the agency provide “guidance” to the health care 
 
 
201 For a complete list, see HHS, Office of Inspector General, Fraud 
Prevention & Detection, Compliance Guidance, at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/ 
complianceguidance.html (last visited June 16, 2003). 
202 It is unclear whether the compliance effort ultimately will prove 
successful. See Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 566 
(arguing “there is a big difference between a compliance program and a 
compliance norm, and provider norms have proved extremely resistant to 
change”). 
203 See HHS Office of Inspector General, Fraud Alerts, Bulletins and Other 
Guidance, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/fraudalerts.html#2 (last visited Feb. 14, 
2003). 
204 Id. 
205 Id. The issuance of an informal Bulletin does not preclude the  
subsequent development of binding regulations on the topic. See, e.g., 
Solicitation of Public Comments on Exceptions Under Section 1128A(a)(5) of 
the Social Security Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 72,892 (Dec. 9, 2002) (following up on the 
August 2002 Special Advisory Bulletin: Offering Gifts and Other Inducements 
to Beneficiaries). 
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industry regarding fraudulent conduct.206 
Perhaps the most controversial Special Advisory Bulletin to 
date was the July 1999 Bulletin concerning “Gainsharing 
Arrangements.”207 In that Bulletin, the OIG construed a civil 
monetary penalty (CMP) provision prohibiting hospitals from 
knowingly making payments to a physician as an inducement to 
reduce or limit services to Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries under 
the physician’s care.208 The OIG interpreted this provision to 
prohibit “gainsharing,” which it defined as “an arrangement in 
which a hospital gives physicians a percentage share of any 
reduction in the hospital’s cost for patient care attributable in part 
to the physicians’ efforts.”209 While acknowledging that hospitals 
have legitimate reasons for desiring that physicians support cost- 
containment efforts, the OIG nonetheless stated that the CMP 
prohibited a hospital from compensating a physician directly or 
indirectly based on cost savings derived from the treatment of the 
physician’s own patients.210 The Bulletin has proven to be quite 
controversial, particularly in light of the Internal Revenue 
Service’s earlier approval of the tax consequences of similar 
arrangements.211 
 
 
206 See Notice, Publication of the OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on 
Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for Hospital Payments to Physicians to 
Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries, 64 Fed. Reg. 37,985 (July 14, 1999), 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/gainsh.htm 
[hereinafter Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements] (stating 
that “[t]he Fraud and Abuse Control Program, established by [HIPAA], 
authorized the OIG to provide guidance to the health care industry to prevent 
fraud and abuse, and to promote the highest level of ethical and lawful 
conduct”). 
207 See id. 
208 See id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(b)(1) (2003). 
209 See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note 
206. 
210 Id. 
211 See, e.g., Gregory M. Luce & Jesse A. Witten, HHS IG’s Gainsharing 
Prohibition Lacks Legal Support, 3 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 753 
(Aug. 11, 1999) (characterizing the OIG’s reasoning as “dubious,” and arguing 
that “the OIG relie[d] upon a selective account of the legislative history”); IRA 
Approves Gainsharing Programs in Two Unreleased Private Letter Rulings, 8 
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Similar to Special Fraud Alerts, the issuance of such Bulletins 
is purely within the agency’s discretion.212 In fact, the Gainsharing 
Bulletin itself arose out of several requests for Advisory Opinions 
concerning gainsharing arrangements.213 Finding that a variety of 
concerns made the issue unsuitable for individual Opinions, 
including the high risk of abuse, the need for ongoing oversight, 
and the need for comprehensive regulations rather than case-by- 
case analysis, the OIG chose instead to issue the industry-wide 
Bulletin.214 It is likely this mechanism will be used in the future to 
disseminate information outside the Special Fraud Alert context, 
especially when the government’s concerns encompass laws 
beyond the Anti-Kickback Statute. 
 
e. Other Forms of Guidance 
 
In addition to these categories, the OIG from time to time 
offers other types of guidance to the health care industry. For 
example, the HHS Inspector General periodically posts “Open 
Letters” to the health care community on the agency’s web site, 
designed to explain the agency’s goals and priorities.215 In 
addition, the OIG periodically releases redacted versions of Anti- 
Kickback-related correspondence. For example, in April 2000, the 
OIG posted copies of two letters addressing providers who 
impermissibly charge the federal health care programs amounts 
that are “substantially in excess” of the provider’s usual charge for 
the services provided.216 While these postings have the virtue of 
 
 
HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) 295 (Feb. 25, 1999) (describing two private letter 
rulings approving gainsharing arrangements between tax-exempt hospitals and 
physician groups). 
212 See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note 
206. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. 
215 For a list of such documents, see HHS, Office of Inspector General, 
Fraud  Prevention  &   Detection,  Open   Letters,  at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/ 
openletters.html (last visited July 15, 2002). 
216 The correspondence is available at HHS Office of Inspector General, 
Fraud Prevention & Detection, Fraud Alerts, Bulletins, and Guidance, 
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making the OIG’s current interpretations accessible to anyone with 
an Internet connection, their legal effects remain unclear. 
 
2. Reliance on Informal Guidance 
 
The government’s evolving views of these informal sources of 
fraud guidance is instructive, particularly with regard to Advisory 
Opinions. Despite numerous requests from health care providers, 
historically the OIG was vehemently opposed to instituting an 
Advisory Opinion process under the Anti-Kickback Statute.217 
During the notice-and-comment period for the proposed safe 
harbor regulations, the agency received numerous comments 
requesting the development of an advisory mechanism.218 Citing 
the statute’s criminal provisions, which are enforced by the DOJ, 
the OIG concluded that it lacked “authority to make judgments that 
are within the exclusive domain of another agency.”219 Noting the 
practical problems caused by the “knowing and willful” intent 
requirement, as well as the resources that such a process would 
require, the OIG argued that the safe harbor regulations were the 
most appropriate mechanism for addressing provider concerns: 
[W]e do not believe that an advisory opinion process is a 
necessary or appropriate mechanism for keeping the 
Department aware of new developments in industry 
practice  and  ensuring  that  the  regulation  remains 
current . . . . We believe that periodic updating of this 
regulation, with the opportunity for public input, is the best 
way to ensure that these regulations remain practical and 
relevant in the face of changes in health care delivery and 
payment arrangements.220 
 
 
http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/fraudalerts.html#3b (last visited July 15, 2002). 
217 See, e.g., Godshall, supra note 181, at 3 (describing the convoluted 
Advisory Opinion regulations as “demonstrat[ing] the agency’s continuing 
opposition” to the process); supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
218 See Medicare and State Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG 
Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959 (July 29, 1991) 
(describing comments). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
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The OIG’s comments thus reflected serious concerns about agency 
authority and resources, as well as a clear preference for the 
traditional regulatory process. 
With the passage of HIPAA, however, many of these concerns 
disappeared. The explicit grant of advisory authority to HHS, 
combined with a mandate for interagency coordination, assuaged 
concerns about potential interference with DOJ investigations. 
Resource concerns were addressed by the HIPAA funding 
provisions, including the creation of the Fraud and Abuse Control 
Program.221 Over time, OIG personnel apparently realized that the 
advisory process could be a very good way of making the agency’s 
views known in a timely and informal manner. By the summer of 
2001, agency personnel appeared to have done an about-face, and 
strongly supported permanent extension of the Advisory Opinion 
authority.222 
In addition to this curious pedigree, the proliferation of these 
quasi-official forms of guidance has important practical 
implications for health care providers. For one thing, there are 
many more places to look for guidance on specific fraud issues 
than in the past. In addition to consulting the statute and safe 
harbors, and poring over the relevant Federal Register preambles, 
health care attorneys now must scrutinize all relevant Advisory 
Opinions, Special Fraud Alerts, Compliance Program Guidances, 
Special Advisory Bulletins, and other forms of guidance. Although 
most of this information is available on the OIG’s web site, it tends 
to be organized in loose topical and chronological fashion (rather 
than, for example, keyed to the relevant statutory provisions).223 
 
 
221 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395i(k)(3) (2003) (describing appropriations to the 
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account); supra Part I. 
222 See Testimony of Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal 
Affairs, Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, at http://oig.hhs.gov/ 
reading/testimony/2001/072601lm.pdf (July 26, 2001) (“In addition to assisting 
the health care industry [to] comply with the law, the advisory opinion and safe 
harbor mechanisms enhance the OIG’s understanding of new and emerging 
health care business arrangements and guide the development of new safe  
harbor regulations, fraud alerts, and advisory bulletins.”). 
223 See HHS, Office of Inspector General, available at http://oig.hhs.gov/ 
index.html (indexing documents) (last visited June 19, 2003). 
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Moreover, this additional guidance does not necessarily clarify the 
ambiguities faced by providers on a daily basis. Especially with 
Advisory Opinions and correspondence, attorneys must try to 
extrapolate general principles from the government’s response to a 
specific set of facts, and then combine that information with the 
binding guidance found in the law and safe harbor provisions. 
Thus, there is a distinct risk that the proliferation of unofficial 
sources of guidance results simply in more—rather than better— 
information regarding health care fraud. 
In addition, because such unofficial guidance generally is not 
binding, such advice is not always consistent. For example, in its 
July 1999 Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG stated that 
gainsharing arrangements were not an appropriate topic for 
Advisory Opinions.224 But in January 2001, with little fanfare (and 
even less attention to the previous Bulletin), the OIG issued an 
Advisory Opinion approving a transaction that was in essence a 
gainsharing arrangement.225 Perhaps, as the OIG argued, the new 
proposal departed so significantly from previous gainsharing 
proposals that different treatment was warranted,226 or perhaps the 
Opinion signaled the OIG’s retreat from its previous hard-line 
prohibition. Of course, no one would argue that agency 
interpretations should not evolve over time; indeed, the ability to 
be responsive to changes in industry practice is one of the greatest 
advantages of informal guidance. Nonetheless, the lack of any 
formal mechanism to warn of policy shifts can make it difficult for 
health care providers to plan future transactions that may implicate 
these concerns. 
Moreover, administrative law principles have significant 
repercussions for health care providers who seek to challenge—or 
 
 
224 See Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements, supra note 
206 (stating that requests “contain common elements that preclude our issuance 
of any favorable opinion,” including high risk of abuse, need for ongoing 
oversight, and need for comprehensive regulation in the area). 
225 OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-1 (Jan. 18, 2001), available at http:// 
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/2001/ao01-01.pdf (declining to impose 
sanctions for a proposal involving a hospital sharing a percentage of cost savings 
with cardiac surgeons who implement certain cost reduction measures). 
226 Id. 
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even to rely on—such quasi-official agency interpretations. As 
noted above, pursuant to the APA, the Social Security Act requires 
notice-and-comment rulemaking for any “rule, requirement, or 
other statement of policy . . . that establishes or changes a 
substantive legal standard governing the scope of benefits [or] the 
payment for services” under the Medicare program.227 However, 
the APA requirement does not apply “to interpretive rules, general 
statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or 
practice.”228 In determining whether rulemaking is required, courts 
have focused on whether the rule is “interpretive” or “legislative” 
in nature. 
An interpretive rule simply states what the administrative 
agency thinks the [underlying] statute means, and only 
reminds affected parties of existing duties. On the other 
hand, if by its action the agency intends to create new law, 
rights, or duties, the rule is properly considered to be a 
legislative rule.229 
It is likely that most of OIG fraud guidance would qualify as 
interpretive rules under this test, and hence would not be subject to 
challenge unless they adopted a new position that was inconsistent 
with prior law or regulations.230 
Disputes over the nature of agency policy usually arise when a 
health care provider seeks to challenge the agency’s informal 
interpretation as contrary to established law, and thus subject to the 
APA rulemaking requirements.231 In the majority of cases, federal 
 
 
227 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2003); 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2003). 
228 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). 
229 Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485, 489 (7th  Cir. 1992);  
see also Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 
1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (providing the test for determining whether a rule is 
interpretive or legislative). 
230 See Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100 (1995) (stating 
“that APA rulemaking would . . . be required if [the rule] adopted a new position 
inconsistent with any of the Secretary’s existing regulations”). 
231 Many such cases arise when a provider asks a court to enjoin the 
enforcement of the challenged provision. The timing of judicial review of 
Medicare cases is complex and has been extensively litigated, generally in the 
context of whether a provider has “exhausted” the relevant administrative 
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courts have held that Medicare manuals, letters, and directives are 
interpretive in nature. Indeed, the Supreme Court described one of 
the Medicare program manuals as “a prototypical example of an 
interpretive rule.”232 On rare occasion, however, courts have found 
a specific policy to be contrary to law. For example, in Loyola 
University of Chicago v. Bowen, the Seventh Circuit refused to 
defer to the Secretary’s interpretation of regulations governing 
hospital reimbursement for education expenses, on the grounds 
that the Medicare Carriers Manual provision on which the 
Secretary relied contained a requirement not found in the law or 
regulations.233 As the court noted, “[a]lthough the Secretary’s 
interpretation of his own regulations is usually accorded substantial 
deference . . . such deference is appropriate only if the Secretary’s 
interpretation of the regulation is consistent with the language of 
 
 
review processes prior to going to court. Briefly, prior to 1986, the Social 
Security Act did not permit judicial review of the amount of Medicare Part B 
benefits. See United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201, 208 (1982). Moreover, 
the Supreme Court had held that judicial review of claims “arising under” 
Medicare Part A was available only after the claimant pursued all levels of 
available HHS review and the Secretary rendered a “final decision.” See Heckler 
v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 605-06 (1984). However, in the 1986 case of Bowen v. 
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, the Supreme Court permitted an 
immediate judicial challenge to a Medicare Part B regulation, noting that the law 
“simply does not speak to challenges mounted against the method by which such 
amounts are to be determined rather than the determinations themselves.” 476 
U.S. 667, 675-76 (1986) (emphasis added). The situation was further 
complicated by a 1986 amendment permitting judicial review of the “amount of 
benefits” under both Medicare Part A and Part B, which may have mooted the 
amount/methodology distinction and required exhaustion of remedies for all 
disputes. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 
100 Stat. 1874 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(a) (2003)); Shalala v. Illinois 
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 14, 20 (2000) (interpreting Bowen 
to permit review in cases where plaintiff “can obtain no review at all unless it 
can obtain judicial review in a [federal question] action”). 
232 Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 99 (construing a Provider 
Reimbursement Manual provision authorizing the Secretary to depart from 
generally accepted accounting principles when making certain reimbursement 
decisions). 
233 905 F.2d 1061, 1071-72 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the Secretary’s 
contention that education activities must occur in a facility that is “part of the 
provider” in order to be reimbursed by Medicare). 
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the regulations themselves.”234 Unless such a showing could be 
made regarding one of the OIG’s informal fraud guidance 
documents, however, a challenge likely would be unavailing.235 
Unlike HHS’ interpretation of the Medicare billing 
requirements, however, the focus of fraud guidance is not 
primarily on reimbursement methodology. Of course, the Medicare 
carriers and intermediaries strive to identify fraud (and to deny 
payment) at the time bills are submitted.236 But the primary manner 
in which the fraud laws are enforced is through the administrative, 
civil, and criminal adjudication processes outlined above.237 While 
a carrier or intermediary may “flag” a particular set of claims as 
raising concerns under the FCA or the Anti-Kickback Statute, the 
contractor has no authority to adjudicate the claimant’s guilt; 
instead, the case must be referred to the OIG (and possibly on to 
the DOJ) for investigation and prosecution.238 In any resulting 
litigation against the claimant, the agency’s guidance will likely 
play a pivotal role in determining whether the law was violated, 
 
 
234 Id. at 1071; see also Am. Lithotripsy Soc’y v. Thompson, 215 F. Supp. 
2d 23 (D.D.C. 2002) (holding that regulation defining lithotripsy as a Stark II 
“designated health service” was contrary to Congressional intent). 
235 See, e.g., Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. at 94-95 (finding that the 
Manual provision authorizing departure from generally accepted accounting 
principles “is a reasonable regulatory interpretation, and we must defer to it”); 
Downtown Med. Ctr./Comprehensive Health Care Clinic v. Bowen, 944 F.2d 
756, 768-69 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding that a Medicare Carrier’s Manual 
provision construing billing requirements was “reasonable and not inconsistent 
with the statute and regulations”). 
236 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395nn(g)(1) (providing that no payment may be 
made for designated health services furnished pursuant to a prohibited referral 
under the Stark Law) & 1893 (creating the Medicare Integrity Program, under 
which HHS is authorized to enter into contracts with entities—including existing 
carriers and intermediaries—to carry out a variety of fraud detection and 
prevention activities). 
237 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pts. 1001, subch. B (2003) (setting  out procedures 
for imposing exclusion), 1003 (setting out procedures for imposing civil 
monetary penalties, assessments, and exclusions) & 1005 (describing the  
appeals process for exclusions, civil monetary penalties, and assessments). 
238 See, e.g., United States v. McClatchey, 217 F.3d 823 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(finding sufficient evidence from which the jury could have convicted the 
defendant of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute). 
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even in situations where the agency’s interpretation is not directly 
binding. 
For example, Advisory Opinions are binding only on the 
parties who request them.239 In Zimmer, Inc. v. Nu Tech Med., Inc., 
a manufacturer of orthopedic products sought to extricate itself 
from a consignment agreement with a supplier by arguing that the 
contract violated the Anti-Kickback Statute.240 In support of its 
contention, the manufacturer sought and received an Advisory 
Opinion from the OIG characterizing the agreement as 
“problematic” and “potentially abusive,” and refusing to immunize 
the relationship from prosecution.241 While noting that the Opinion 
did not bind any agency other than HHS, the court acknowledged 
that “[n]onetheless, courts give great deference to agency 
regulations and agency interpretations of those regulations,” and 
found it proper for the plaintiff to introduce the Opinion into 
evidence.242 The court ultimately agreed with the OIG’s analysis of 
the facts and held that because the agreement violated the Anti- 
Kickback Statute, it was void and unenforceable under Indiana 
law.243 
As this example suggests, courts will look to the agency’s 
interpretation of the fraud and abuse statutes not only in 
enforcement actions against a defendant health care provider, but 
also in civil actions between the parties to an agreement. For 
example, in Polk County v. Peters, a hospital unsuccessfully sued a 
physician for money the hospital had advanced pursuant to a 
recruitment agreement.244 Noting that the OIG had issued a Special 
Fraud Alert detailing suspect hospital incentives to physicians— 
many of which were present in the case—the court found the 
 
 
239 See 42 U.S.C. §1320a-7d(b)(4) (2003) (describing the effect  of 
opinions). 
240 54 F. Supp. 2d 850, 853 (N.D. Ind. 1999). 
241  Id.  at  854-56  (quoting  Advisory  Opinion  No.  98-1,  Mar.  19, 1998, 
available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/advisoryopinions/1998/ao98_19. pdf). 
242 54 F. Supp. 2d at 856. See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (deferring to the agency’s interpretation of its 
own statutory mandate). 
243 54 F. Supp. 2d at 863. 
244 800 F. Supp. 1451 (E. D. Tex. 1992). 
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agreement to be in violation of the anti-referral statutes, and thus 
void and unenforceable under Texas law.245 Such cases raise the 
possibility that plaintiffs may be able to use this guidance as a tool 
to help them avoid onerous health care contracts as against public 
policy—something of an odd result for guidance designed 
primarily to protect patients, rather than to assist providers who are 
dissatisfied with their business deals. 
Just as health care providers have a limited ability to challenge 
such informal sources of agency guidance, it similarly is unclear 
how far they are entitled to rely on them to defend their actions. As 
the Supreme Court has noted, “[i]nterpretive rules do not require 
notice and comments, although . . . they also do not have the force 
and effect of law and are not accorded that weight in the 
adjudicatory process.”246 It is well-accepted that the government 
cannot be estopped by erroneous representations made by its 
employees and agents, particularly regarding questions of benefit 
entitlements.247 In the health care context, courts have held that 
providers are not entitled to rely on erroneous oral advice from 
carriers and intermediaries with regard to Medicare rules and 
regulations.248 The fact that the relevant forms of OIG guidance are 
 
 
245 Id. at 1455-56. Another district court cited the same Special Fraud Alert 
in a similar physician recruitment case, but found that unlike in Polk, the 
agreement’s language was ambiguous enough to preclude summary judgment 
with respect to whether patient referrals were required in return for the hospital’s 
payment. See Feldstein v. Nash Community Health Servs., Inc., 51 F. Supp 673 
(E.D.N.C. 1999). 
246 Shalala v. Guernsey Mem’l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995). 
247 See Office of Personal Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 414 (1990) 
(holding that erroneous oral and written advice regarding a claimant’s eligibility 
for disability benefits did not entitle the claimant to benefits that were not 
authorized by law). 
248 In so holding, courts often focus on the provider’s duty to be familiar 
with relevant program requirements. See, e.g., Heckler v. Community Health 
Servs. of Crawford County, 647 U.S. 51, 64 (1984) (refusing to bind the 
government to oral advice given by a fiscal intermediary regarding whether 
certain salary payments were reimbursable as reasonable costs under Medicare, 
and noting that “[a]s a participant in the Medicare program, respondent had a 
duty to familiarize itself with the legal requirements for cost reimbursement”); 
Downtown Med. Ctr./Comprehensive Health Care Clinic v. Bowen, 944 F.2d 
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written, however, is unlikely to provide protection; indeed, the 
challenged advice in one such case included not only oral 
statements, but also an outdated government form containing the 
erroneous information.249 It is not inconceivable, then, that a 
provider might have difficulty relying on informal guidance in its 
defense, at least if the government’s views have since changed. 
Nonetheless, a provider’s reliance on fraud guidance should be 
strengthened by the fact that the majority of health care fraud laws 
require evidence of the defendant’s fraudulent intent before a 
violation can be established.250 Although reliance on erroneous 
agency statements will not establish a defense as a matter of law, 
the fact that the defendant sought in good faith to comply with 
such advice may establish that the defendant lacked the requisite 
intent needed to violate the law.251 Moreover, to the extent the 
government desires that informal guidance strengthen its 
relationship with the industry, it would be counterproductive to 
revise agency policy without giving providers enough time to 
comply with new interpretations.252 For example, mindful that the 
Special Advisory Bulletin on Gainsharing Arrangements would 
 
 
 
756, 760, 771 (10th Cir. 1991) (refusing to estop the government from denying 
reimbursement for physical therapy and psychological services on the ground 
that the Medicare carrier erroneously had advised the provider that it could bill 
for the services under a single provider number). 
249 See Office of Personal Mgmt., 496 U.S. at 417. 
250 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)-(2) (2003) (prohibiting defendants 
from “knowingly and willfully” engaging in acts that violate the Anti-Kickback 
Statute); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2003) (barring defendants from “knowingly” 
submitting false claims under the FCA). The major exception is the Stark Law, 
which has no intent requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (2003) (outlining 
the prohibition). 
251 See, e.g., United States ex. rel. Oliver v. Parsons Company, 195 F.3d 
457, 464 (9th Cir. 1999) (“A contractor relying on a good faith interpretation of 
a regulation is not subject to liability . . . because the good faith nature of his or 
her action forecloses the possibility that the scienter requirement is met.”). 
252 Cf. William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to 
Participation in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201, 
203 (1998) (arguing that “[r]educing idiosyncratic risks of doing business with 
federal purchasing agencies is a key step toward establishing effective 
public/private partnerships . . .”). 
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come as a surprise to many providers, the OIG agreed to “take into 
consideration in exercising its enforcement discretion whether 
[such an] arrangement was terminated expeditiously following 
publication of the Bulletin.”253 Thus, providers are unlikely to be 
penalized for following agency advice as long as they seek to 
revise their practices in a timely fashion. Nonetheless, providers 
may find the potential for liability due to their reliance on outdated 
advice to be unsettling, particularly when combined with other 
practical difficulties raised by the proliferation of informal 
guidance sources. 
 
C. Litigation 
 
The problems with both traditional forms of regulation and the 
proliferation of informal guidance mechanisms have generated 
attempts to address legal and regulatory ambiguity through 
litigation based on novel interpretations of the underlying 
provisions. The majority of these cases have been brought under 
the FCA, either as direct government prosecutions or as private 
actions under the law’s broad qui tam provisions. Such litigation is 
traditionally viewed as an example of ex post enforcement, under 
which the government investigates and prosecutes conduct by 
entities who have violated the rules against health care fraud.254 
The situation is complicated, however, by the existence of an 
inordinate number of “gray areas” in federal health care program 
reimbursement, the difficulty of detecting fraud during claims 
processing, and the concomitantly low risk of an individual 
provider being caught and disciplined for any misbehavior.255 As 
 
 
253  Special  Advisory  Bulletin  on  Gainsharing  Arrangements,  supra note 
206. See also 42 C.F.R. §§ 1008.45(b)(2)-(3) (2003) (providing that if the OIG 
terminates or modifies a previously issued Advisory Opinion, it “will not 
proceed against the requestor . . . if such action was promptly, diligently, and in 
good faith” discontinued or modified within a reasonable period of time). 
254 See Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1282-88 (describing public ex post 
enforcement). 
255 See Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 538-39 
(describing the low likelihood of fraud being detected and punished); supra note 
6  and  accompanying  text  (explaining  the  complexity  of  federal  health care 
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Professor David Hyman has noted, “program administrators can 
compensate for a low risk of detection/conviction (that is, ex ante 
underinvestment in claims review) by imposing substantial ex post 
sanctions for misconduct,” an approach that may be “relatively 
unproblematic from an economic perspective . . . [but] 
questionable on psychological grounds.”256 Moreover, when the 
threat of such litigation can only be reduced by the defendant’s 
agreement to abide by novel program conditions not otherwise 
imposed by law or regulation, the settlement process may have the 
effect of transforming an ex post enforcement mechanism into an 
ex ante means of imposing compliance as the “price” of continued 
participation in the programs.257 Thus, while these cases have met 
with a certain degree of practical success, they raise a variety of 
troubling procedural and jurisprudential concerns. 
 
1. Procedural Concerns 
 
The procedural issues involved in the litigation process 
primarily concern the role of the qui tam relator, particularly the 
question of whether the relator has standing to maintain the suit if 
the government declines to intervene.258 In Vermont Agency of 
Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, a company was 
accused of billing the government for more hours than its 
employees actually spent on federally funded projects; the United 
States declined to intervene in the suit.259 The Supreme Court held 
that in such circumstances, the relator has standing to sue as a 
 
 
program requirements). 
256 Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 540. See also 
id. at 564 (characterizing the current process as the “haphazard extraction of ex 
post discounts from some providers and the ritual sacrifice (either through 
conviction/program exclusion or the imposition of staggering defense costs) of 
other providers”). 
257 Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1287 (describing immediate forms of 
enforcement). 
258 See Krause, supra note 49, at 158-61 (presenting a detailed analysis of 
standing and fiscal harm). See id. at 136 n. 60 (discussing other procedural 
issues raised by qui tam suits). 
259 529 U.S. 765, 843-44 (2000). 
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partial assignee of the government’s own damages claim.260 By 
holding that the relator has standing only in a derivative capacity, 
however, Stevens left open the issue of whether the government 
would have standing in the absence of its own financial injury. 
The Stevens Court did offer a modicum of guidance: 
It is beyond doubt that the complaint asserts an injury to the 
United States—both the injury to its sovereignty arising 
from violation of its laws (which suffices to support a 
criminal lawsuit by the Government) and the proprietary 
injury resulting from the alleged fraud.261 
In recognizing that the requisite harm can arise both from a 
“proprietary” injury and from an injury to the government’s 
“sovereignty,” the Court suggested that the government can be 
harmed under the FCA in ways that are not primarily financial, 
such as by violation of underlying program requirements or 
interference with government functions.262 Because the allegations 
in the case concerned both sovereign and proprietary injury, 
however, the Court had no occasion to address whether non- 
proprietary injury, standing alone, would suffice.263 While Stevens 
suggests that government standing is unlikely to be at issue in most 
FCA cases, the question may remain open in the rare case where it 
can be shown that the government suffered no conceivable harm 
from the defendant’s acts. 
Moreover, while Stevens resolved the Article III standing 
question, it did not address whether qui tam suits violate the 
Article II Appointments or Take Care Clauses of the United States 
Constitution.264 The Article II issues have been developed most 
fully in Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hospital, where a former 
 
 
 
260 Id. at 846 (holding “that the United States’ injury in fact suffices to 
confer standing on respondent Stevens”). 
261 Id. at 844. 
262 See Krause, supra note 49, at 167-84 (discussing non-financial ways in 
which government can be harmed by false claims). 
263 529 U.S. 765. 
264 U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2, 3; see Stevens, 529 U.S. at 848 n.8. But see 
Stevens, 529 U.S. at 878 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the evidence was 
“sufficient to resolve the Article II questions” as well). 
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nurse sued a hospital under the qui tam provisions.265 Despite the 
plaintiff’s allegations that the defendants had conspired to defraud 
the United States Treasury, the government declined to intervene 
in the suit.266 In 1997, before the Stevens case reached the Supreme 
Court, a district court dismissed the suit for lack of standing.267 On 
appeal, a fifth circuit panel held that Riley had standing to sue, but 
that the suit violated the separation of powers doctrine and the 
Take Care Clause.268 The court subsequently agreed to rehear the 
case en banc, but delayed its decision pending the Supreme  
Court’s opinion in Stevens.269 Finally, in May 2001, the Fifth 
Circuit issued an en banc opinion holding that the alleged 
delegation of prosecutorial power to the relator does not violate the 
Take Care or Appointments Clauses.270 Nonetheless, in  the 
absence of guidance from the Supreme Court, the issue remains 
controversial. 
 
2. Jurisprudential Concerns 
 
While the constitutional contours of FCA enforcement remain 
confusing, judicial precedent offers a framework under which  
these issues eventually may be clarified. More troubling, however, 
are the fundamental fairness issues raised by permitting the 
litigation process to be used to make substantive legal 
 
 
265 Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 252 F.3d 749 (5th Cir. 2001) (en 
banc) (reversing the panel’s decision that the qui tam provisions violated the 
Take Care Clause and separation of powers principles). 
266 Id. at 751 (relating procedural history). 
267 United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 982 F. Supp. 
1261, 1268-69 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
268 Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 196 F.3d 514 (5th Cir. 1999). 
269 Id. 
270  Riley, 252 F. 3d at 749. The district court subsequently dismissed the  
qui tam claims, see United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 
200 F. Supp. 2d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2002), but they were reinstated by the Fifth 
Circuit. See United States ex. rel Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 
370 (5th Cir. 2004). See also Richard A. Bales, A Constitutional Defense of Qui 
Tam, 2001 WISC. L. REV. 381, 437 (arguing that “dispersal of power among the 
citizens,” unlike the aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of another, is 
consistent with the separation of powers doctrine). 
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determinations in the absence of traditional legislative and 
regulatory rulemaking procedures. In the health care fraud context, 
these concerns center on one particular phenomenon: the fact that 
the vast majority of such cases settle, rather than proceeding to 
trial.271 
The enormous potential liability under the Act, which includes 
not only tremendous civil penalties but also the specter of 
exclusion from federal health care programs, convinces many 
health care providers to settle FCA allegations for more reasonable 
sums plus the government’s agreement not to pursue exclusion.272 
As health economist Uwe Reinhardt has noted, “[r]ather than 
engaging in a long, protracted fight to set the record straight, 
throughout which share prices suffer and business slumps, a health 
company’s best bet may simply be to hand over the fines and get 
on with business.”273 
While settlements may be preferable from the perspective of 
the parties involved in the litigation, they may not benefit the 
industry as a whole. To the extent settlement removes many factual 
and legal issues from judicial scrutiny, it may preclude a health 
care provider from arguing a range of issues that are crucial to the 
development of health care regulatory policy.274 The result of such 
 
 
271 See Aussprung, supra note 37, at 3. 
272 See Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1413 (arguing that 
settlements permit unchecked prosecutorial discretion); Aussprung, supra note 
37, at 3 (noting “only a small minority of health care fraud and abuse cases go to 
trial”); supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text (explaining the astronomical 
penalties that may be imposed under the FCA). This appears to be part of a 
broader trend in civil litigation. See Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, 
A.B.A.J., Oct. 2002, at 24 (discussing the decline in number of federal trials and 
the increase in settlements and alternative dispute mechanisms). 
273 Reinhardt, supra note 7. See also William M. Sage, Fraud and Abuse 
Law, 282 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1179, 1180 (1999) (noting that “large 
organizations have such a large stake in avoiding exclusion from Medicare that 
they readily settle pending charges, making much of fraud control resemble a 
rebate program more than a law enforcement exercise”); Hyman, Health Care 
Fraud and Abuse, supra note 171, at 552 (arguing that “the FCA makes it 
possible for the government and qui tam relators to extract the equivalent of 
greenmail as a discount off list price”). 
274 As one commentator has argued, “many aspects of the law are never 
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settlements is an unofficial body of law comprised of legally 
untested theories of falsity and fraud—an amorphous body of 
quasi-legal guidance with no precedential value, but on which the 
government will nevertheless rely in future enforcement efforts.275 
Admittedly, not all such settlements are equally troublesome. 
Many settlements dispose of purely factual issues, such as the truth 
or falsity of the claims submitted. For example, if a physician 
settles accusations that she “upcoded” bills by charging for a more 
expensive category of services than was rendered, the physician 
clearly will sacrifice her ability to prove that some of the 
challenged codes were in fact accurate.276 Although many 
settlement agreements make clear that the defendant is not 
admitting liability, it is equally clear that by settling, the defendant 
has waived the right to contest the truth of the government’s 
allegations.277 While the result might strike us as unfair if the 
government’s accusations lacked any evidentiary basis, the 
decision to settle these factual disputes is a strategic one based on 
whether the defendant wants to incur the time and expense of a 
trial.278 
 
 
litigated and never face the winnowing effects of judicial scrutiny.” Sarah A. 
Klein, False Claims Act: Protection or Persecution? AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 15, 
1999, at 6. Cf. Lars Noah, Administrative Arm-Twisting in the Shadow of 
Congressional Delegations of Authority, 1997 WISC. L. REV. 873, 926-27 
(urging increased judicial oversight of agency consent decrees); Waller, supra 
note 175, at 1413 (decrying the “long-standing trend in which the courts appear 
to focus more on the enforcement of the private bargain reached by the parties 
rather than engage in a meaningful review of the public interest aspects of the 
private bargain itself” in the antitrust context). 
275 See Aussprung, supra note 37, at 1 (describing settlements as “a de facto 
body of health care fraud and abuse law”). 
276 Cf. Bucy, supra note 34, at 6 (describing a University of Pennsylvania 
PATH settlement based, in part, on allegations of upcoding for services rendered 
by physicians on the medical school faculty). 
277 See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi Baptist Med. Ctr., Settlement 
Agreement, Oct. 10, 1999, reprinted in HEALTHCARE COMPLIANCE REP. (CCH) 
¶ 130,318 (noting that “the Hospital by executing this Agreement does not admit 
to any liability or wrongdoing”). 
278 See id. at ¶ 130,318 (“The United States and the Hospital disagree on 
whether any of the Claims described . . . might qualify as ‘false claims’ . . . . 
However, to avoid the time, expense, and uncertainty of litigation, the parties 
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What is more troubling, at least to this author, are situations in 
which the settlement process is used to circumvent judicial review 
of legal theories of falsity, fraud, or other elements of the law. For 
example, defining the requisite elements of falsity and intent under 
the FCA has proven to be a complicated task for the judiciary, at 
times resulting in inconsistent opinions.279 At trial, this ambiguity 
offers the defendant an opportunity to try to persuade the judge  
that its interpretation of the rules was correct, or at least constituted 
a good faith error. As commentators have noted, however, 
“[w]hether or not a provider who innocently misconstrues a 
complex regulation would ever actually be found guilty in a court 
of law is in some ways moot if the provider cannot risk putting the 
issue of its culpability to the trier of fact.”280 Recent enforcement 
efforts offer many examples of this phenomenon, but two will 
suffice: (a) the “bootstrapping” of regulatory violations into a basis 
for FCA liability; and (b) the recent debate over the prices the 
Medicare program pays for prescription drugs. 
 
a. FCA Liability Based on Regulatory Violations 
 
As noted above, a major FCA dispute concerns whether the  
law can be used as a vehicle for allegations that the defendant has 
violated other legal provisions pertaining to the federal health care 
programs—provisions that do not themselves provide private  
rights of action.281 For several years, federal prosecutors and qui 
tam relators have invoked the FCA in situations where health care 
services were delivered to patients as claimed, but where the 
provider may have violated underlying legal requirements (such as 
the anti-referral laws) in furnishing the care.282 Although there are 
few reported opinions on the merits of these allegations, several 
courts appear sympathetic to the proposition that a violation of the 
 
 
have agreed to settle the matter.”). 
279 See Krause, supra note 49, at 151-58 (discussing the judiciary’s  
tendency to confuse the elements of the FCA cause of action). 
280 Jost & Davies, supra note 53, at 265. 
281 See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text. 
282 See Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1391-1406 
(discussing FCA cases). 
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Anti-Kickback or Stark provisions may render subsequent claims 
for legitimate health care services per se false.283 
Not all courts have accepted this argument. In United States ex 
rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare, the Fifth Circuit 
rejected such per se allegations, limiting FCA suits to situations 
involving the false certification of compliance with relevant 
laws.284 As the court noted, “where the government has 
conditioned payment of a claim upon certification of compliance 
with, for example, a statute or regulation, a claimant submits a 
false or fraudulent claim when he or she falsely certifies 
compliance with that statute or regulation.”285 Under this approach, 
liability will hinge on whether certification of compliance with the 
relevant legal provisions truly is a condition of payment—often a 
difficult proposition to prove with regard to the federal health care 
programs.286 
 
 
283 See id. (describing cases); United States ex rel. Roy v. Anthony, 914 F. 
Supp. 1504, 1506 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding the relator “could produce  
evidence that would show that the kickbacks allegedly paid to the defendant 
physicians somehow tainted the claims for Medicare”); United States ex rel. 
Pogue v. American Healthcorp., Inc., 914 F. Supp. 1507, 1509 (M.D. Tenn. 
1996) (noting that “[a] recent trend of cases appear to support [the] proposition 
that a violation of Medicare anti-kickback and self-referral laws also constitutes 
a violation of the False Claims Act”). In a later proceeding after the Pogue 
allegations were transferred as part of multidistrict litigation, the district court 
affirmed the validity of these basic allegations. See United States ex. rel. Pogue 
v. Diabetes Treatment Ctrs. Of America, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 258, 263-66 
(D.D.C. 2002) (upholding validity of theory). 
284 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting that “claims for services 
rendered in violation of a statute do not necessarily constitute false or fraudulent 
claims under the FCA”). See also United States ex. rel. Barmak v. Sutter Corp., 
No. 95 CIV.7637 KTD RLE, 2002 WL 987109 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002), at *5- 
6 (rejecting the argument “that a violation of the anti-kickback statute is ipso 
facto a violation of the FCA,” and noting the lack of causal relation between the 
alleged violations and the submission of claims); Krause, supra note 49, at 175- 
81 (discussing the certification approach). 
285  125 F.3d at 902 (emphasis added). 
286 Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58. As the author previously  
has argued, claims submitted in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute are not 
automatically “statutorily ineligible for payment,” as some commentators posit. 
Id. at 1394 (disagreeing with the district court’s conclusion on remand in United 
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A few years later, the Fifth Circuit appeared to retreat from its 
focus on express certification. In United States v. Southland Mgt. 
Corp., the owners of a low-income housing project were accused 
of misrepresenting the condition of apartments subsidized by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).287 The 
government argued that the defendants’ payment vouchers falsely 
certified that the units were in “decent, safe, and sanitary 
condition,” despite the fact that repeated inspections had 
documented numerous deficiencies.288 HUD, however, continued 
to pay the vouchers while negotiating a corrective action plan.289 
Given HUD’s knowledge of the true conditions of the premises, 
the district court held that the misrepresentations obviously were 
not material to the agency’s decision to disburse funds to the 
defendants.290 
While acknowledging that the FCA contains a materiality 
requirement, a panel of the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court’s reliance on how HUD factually handled the claims.291 
Instead, the court cited Thompson for the proposition that 
materiality is to be judged by the legal requirements of the statute, 
noting that the “disposition of this claim clearly indicates that if a 
certification of compliance with a statute or regulation is a 
 
 
States ex. rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Health Care Corp., 20 F. Supp. 2d 
1017, 1047 (S.D. Tex. 1998)). Failure to comply with the Anti-Kickback Statute 
does not necessarily lead to either non-payment or expulsion from federal health 
care programs. Id. 
287 288 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002). 
288 Id. at 673. 
289 Id. 
290 95 F. Supp. 2d 629 (S.D. Miss. 2000). Moreover, the district court 
suggested the government’s prior knowledge of the defendants’ activities could 
preclude a finding of falsity and/or intent. Id. at 643. 
[B]ecause the defendants were fully apprised of HUD’s awareness of 
the problems at the apartments which now form the basis of the 
Government’s suit, and in fact, corresponded with HUD with respect to 
those very same problems, there can simply be no reasonable finding 
that defendants “knowingly” made a false statement or claim to HUD 
regarding the condition of the property. 
Id.  
291 Southland Mgt. Corp., 288 F.3d at 695. 
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prerequisite to the defendant’s legal entitlement to funds, the 
certification is a material misrepresentation and renders the claim 
false as a matter of law.”292 To the extent the court focused on the 
language of the statute and regulations in the abstract, rather than 
the government’s actual payment procedures, litigants feared one 
avenue of FCA defense had been foreclosed.293 
In April 2003, however, after rehearing the case en banc, the 
Fifth Circuit issued a new opinion upholding the district court’s 
judgment for the defendant property owners.294 This time, the 
court’s inquiry focused on the language of the agreement in 
question.295 Noting that the contract permitted HUD to undertake a 
variety of remedial actions against owners who failed to comply 
with program regulations, the court held that “[d]uring the 
corrective action period . . . claims for housing assistance  
payments are not false claims because they are claims for money to 
which the Owners are entitled (and which provide the wherewithal 
both to operate the property and to take the necessary corrective 
actions).”296 In essence, the en banc opinion returned the focus to 
the government’s actual payment decision rather than an abstract 
reading of the program requirements, suggesting that defendants 
should have an opportunity to prove their alleged 
misrepresentations were not truly material to the government’s 
payment decision and hence not actionable under the FCA. 
Although much of the controversy thus far has centered on 
 
 
 
292 Id. at 679 (emphasis added). According to the dissent, the majority’s 
interpretation of this novel “claim materiality” requirement was “ingenious but 
wrong.” See id. at 693 (Jones, J., dissenting). See also Krause, supra note 49, at 
188-201 (discussing FCA materiality requirement). 
293 Southland Mgt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665. 
294 United States v. Southland Mgt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2003). 
295 Id. 
296 Id. at 676. In a separate concurrence, Judge Jones objected to the 
majority’s reliance on the contract terms, arguing that the case should have been 
affirmed because: (1) the defendants’ certifications were not material to HUD’s 
payment decision; and (2) the defendants could not “knowingly” have submitted 
false claims because the government was fully aware of the condition of the 
property. Id. at 678 (Jones, J., concurring). In her words, “[t]he government got 
exactly what it was willing to pay for.” Id. 
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attempts to base FCA suits on violations of the anti-referral 
provisions, the more significant long-term impact of this approach 
may result from its application in the quality-of-care context. 
Health care providers, particularly institutions, must satisfy a wide 
range of highly technical conditions for participation in the federal 
health care programs.297 Failure to satisfy these conditions will 
subject the provider to a variety of sanctions, including civil 
penalties and possible program exclusion.298 Recently, the 
government and qui tam relators have argued that a request for 
payment submitted when the provider is out of compliance with 
any of these standards should be considered “false or fraudulent” 
under the FCA, even if the underlying noncompliance likely would 
not lead to any significant sanctions by program administrators.299 
One of the first uses of this approach occurred in United States 
ex. rel. Aranda v. Community Psychiatric Centers, in which a 
psychiatric hospital was accused of failing to provide Medicaid 
patients with the “reasonably safe environment” required by 
federal law.300 The government argued that by billing Medicaid for 
patient care services, the hospital had implicitly and untruthfully 
certified that it was in compliance with all program-related quality 
requirements.301 The district court agreed this could be a viable 
 
 
297 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. pt. 482 (2003) (describing the “conditions of 
participation” for hospitals). 
298 See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 488.406 (2003) (identifying remedies that may be 
imposed when long-term care facility fails to comply with conditions of 
participation). 
299 See Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal 
False Claims Act to Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Health Care Industry, 
51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 123 (1999). 
[T]hese conditions are not conditions of payment. To the contrary, the 
relevant Medicare regulations make clear that if a condition of 
participation is not satisfied, the provider is not excluded from the 
program, and payment is not stopped unless the HCFA determines that 
an immediate threat to the health or safety of patients exists. 
Id.  
300 945 F. Supp. 1485 (W.D. Okla. 1996) (alleging that the environment 
was not “reasonably safe” because patients suffered physical injury and sexual 
abuse). 
301 Id. at 1487. 
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theory of falsity and denied the hospital’s motion to dismiss, 
noting that the Medicaid law and regulations mandated compliance 
with certain quality standards.302 
Similar allegations were made in United States v. NHC 
Healthcare Corp., in which the government argued that the 
defendant nursing home “was so severely understaffed that it could 
not possibly have administered all of the care it was obligated to 
perform” for federal health care program patients.303 The district 
court held that this approach required the government to prove 
“that the patients were not provided the quality of care which 
promotes the maintenance and the enhancement of the quality of 
life,” as required by the Medicare and Medicaid programs.304 
Citing Aranda, the court found that the FCA applied to the 
submission of claims for services not actually performed, and 
denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss.305 
Federal prosecutors have invoked this theory more broadly 
against nursing homes that allegedly bill the government for 
“inadequate” care. Since 1996, the United States Attorneys Office 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania has taken the lead in these 
cases, negotiating a number of high-profile settlements.306 
Although the facilities generally have not admitted any 
wrongdoing, common elements of these settlements include the 
payment of civil penalties, development of training and oversight 
procedures for specific problem areas, third-party monitoring of 
 
 
 
302 Id. at 1488. Because the opinion concerned a motion to dismiss, the  
court did not have occasion to address whether the plaintiff ultimately would 
have prevailed on the merits. For a detailed discussion of the implied 
certification approach, as contrasted with the explicit certification and per se 
approaches, see Krause, “Promises to Keep”, supra note 58, at 1392-1406. 
303 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149 (W.D. Mo. 2000). 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 See, e.g., David R. Hoffman, The Role of the Federal Government in 
Ensuring Quality of Care in Long-Term Care Facilities, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 
147 (1997) (prosecuting attorney’s discussion of United States v. GMS 
Management-Tucker, Inc. No. 96-1271 (E.D. Pa., settled Feb. 21, 1996)); 
Northern Health Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 2d 563 (D. Md. 
1998). 
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quality conditions, and adoption of a corporate compliance 
program.307 While critics have argued that the inherently subjective 
issue of health care “quality” is better addressed through the health 
care licensing and disciplinary systems than through fraud 
prosecutions, quality of care clearly has become one of the 
government’s top fraud enforcement priorities.308 As the OIG 
warned in its Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing 
Facilities, “knowingly billing for nonexistent or substandard care, 
items, or services” may be actionable under the FCA.309 Thus, 
despite the lack of case law on the merits of these disputes, the 
FCA successfully has been used to negotiate settlements based on 
regulatory violations. 
The consequences of using the litigation approach in this 
context are significant. In both the anti-referral and quality-of-care 
contexts, plaintiffs have successfully utilized FCA litigation to 
circumvent the normal adjudicative processes for determining 
whether an underlying violation has occurred and what sanctions 
may be appropriate.310 When the suits are brought by the 
government, this strategy allows prosecutors to negotiate a 
favorable resolution of the allegations without proving that a 
violation actually occurred. Of course, to the extent a settlement 
primarily benefits patients, it is difficult to argue that the result is 
anything but a success. But when the suit is brought by a private 
party under the FCA qui tam provision, the result is somewhat 
different: the circumvention of the standard regulatory appeals 
process results in the diversion of some part of the proceeds into 
the pockets of private individuals, rather than into the Medicare 
 
 
307 See, e.g., Hoffman, supra note 306, at 154-55. 
308 See Fabrikant & Solomon, supra note 299, at 160-61 (arguing that a 
more appropriate remedy is to strengthen federal and state regulatory agency 
oversight of such institutions). 
309 Publication of the OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing 
Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14289, 14295 n.49 (March 16, 2000). 
310 See Timothy P. Blanchard, Medicare Medical Necessity Determinations 
Revisited: Abuse of Discretion and Abuse of Process in the War Against 
Medicare Fraud and Abuse, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 91, 94 (1999) (noting that 
when medical necessity disputes are handled through the administrative appeals 
process, rather than the FCA, health care providers often prevail). 
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Trust Fund or the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account. 
In such circumstances, the benefit to patients is reduced 
significantly. 
 
b. Drug Pricing Issues 
 
Another example of the use of FCA litigation to address 
regulatory ambiguity concerns the prescription drug industry, 
which has been under considerable scrutiny in recent years. In the 
past, the majority of this attention focused on drug sales and 
marketing practices, which potentially implicate the Anti-Kickback 
Statute.311 As the OIG noted in a 1994 Special Fraud Alert on 
Prescription Drug Marketing Schemes: 
Traditionally, physicians and pharmacists have been trusted 
to provide treatments and recommend products in the best 
interest of the patient. In an era of aggressive drug 
marketing, however, patients may now be using 
prescription drug items, unaware that their physician or 
pharmacist is compensated for promoting the selection of a 
specific product.312 
Because drug manufacturers do not submit bills directly to the 
federal health care programs, but rather sell their products to 
physicians, pharmacists, and patients, it has been difficult to reach 
these companies under traditional false billing theories. However, 
the recent extension of the exclusion sanction to include entities 
that indirectly furnish items and services to federal health care 
program beneficiaries has markedly strengthened the government’s 
negotiating position relative to drug manufactures.313 
In addition to their sales and marketing practices, prescription 
drug companies have come under scrutiny for allegedly inflating 
the prices paid for their products by the federal health care 
 
 
311 See generally Bulleit & Krause, supra note 68. 
312 Office of the Inspector Gen., Special Fraud Alert: Prescription Drug 
Marketing Schemes (Aug. 1994), reprinted in Publication of OIG Special Fraud 
Alerts, 59 Fed. Reg. 65,372, 65,376 (Dec. 19, 1994). 
313 See 42 C.F.R. § 1000.10 (2003); supra notes 86-87 and accompanying 
text. 
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programs, particularly Medicare.314 As of December 2003, 
Medicare generally reimbursed physicians on the basis of (i) their 
actual charges or (ii) 95 percent of the “Average Wholesale Price” 
(AWP) for drugs they administer in the office setting.315 
Unfortunately, the Medicare statute and regulations did not define 
this “average” price. Instead, the Medicare contractors based their 
calculations on information contained in pharmaceutical pricing 
publications and databases, which in turn received information 
directly from the manufacturers.316 There is widespread agreement 
that the published prices do not reflect the actual price at which 
many physicians are able to purchase these products, due to 
volume discounts and other purchasing incentives.317 Thus, 
reliance on published AWP may result in payments that are 
significantly higher than what many physicians actually pay for the 
drug, resulting in a nice profit—or “kickback”—when the 
physician is reimbursed.318 
 
 
314 See Paul E. Kalb  et al., The Average Wholesale Price: It “Ain’t What  
the Government Wants to Pay”, 5 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 182 
(2001). 
315 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395u(o)(1) & 13951(a)(1)(s) (2003). Medicare generally 
does not cover self-administered outpatient prescription drugs, such as pills. Id. 
§ 1395x(s)(2)(A) (excluding coverage). Despite this significant limitation, 
preliminary estimates are that the program spent $8.4 billion on prescription 
drugs in 2002. See Medicare Program; Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68 
Fed. Reg. 50428, 50429 (Aug. 20, 2003) (citing statistics). 
316 John K. Iglehart, Medicare and Drug Pricing, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1590, 1591 (2003). 
317 Id. 
318 See Kalb, supra note 314. Similarly, the Medicaid pricing provisions are 
notoriously complex. In brief, payment for single-source drugs may not exceed 
the lower of the estimated acquisition cost plus a reasonable dispensing fee, or 
the usual or customary charge. 42 C.F.R. § 447.331(b) (2003). Within these 
limits, states may develop their own reimbursement methodologies, which often 
are based on discounted AWP. See STATE MEDICAID MANUAL § 6305.1.B 
(stating that AWP, without a “significant” discount, is no longer an acceptable 
price estimate). In addition, the state Medicaid programs receive rebates from 
drug manufacturers, based on the greater of: (a) a statutory minimum 
percentage; or (b) the difference between the average price paid by wholesalers 
for products distributed for retail trade (“average manufacturer price”) and the 
“best price” paid for the product (i.e., the lowest price actually paid by any 
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The most famous example of “AWP fraud” to date involved 
TAP Pharmaceutical Products, which in October 2001 agreed to 
pay a record $875 million dollars to settle a variety of civil and 
criminal fraud allegations stemming from the sale of its cancer 
drug Lupron.319 The government alleged that TAP knowingly 
reported AWP information that was significantly higher than 
Lupron’s true average sales price, thus assuring Medicare 
reimbursement would remain artificially high.320 Of course, this 
strategy did not directly translate into higher revenues for TAP: 
because the company does not sell its products directly to the 
Medicare program, it could not directly reap the benefits of the 
inflated price.321 So the government further alleged that TAP 
“marketed the spread” between the discounted prices paid by its 
physician customers and the artificially high Medicare 
reimbursement—thus offering its customers a financial inducement 
to prescribe Lupron in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute, and 
potentially implicating the FCA.322 Moreover, by concealing the 
true pricing structure from Medicare and falsely advising its 
customers to report AWP rather than the actual price of the drug, 
TAP allegedly caused its customers to submit false claims.323 
Settlement  of  the  FCA  allegations  accounted  for approximately 
$560 million of TAP’s total payment, and disposed of two separate 
qui tam cases against the company.324 
 
 
purchaser for the product, with the exception of certain government purchases). 
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(c)(1) (2003). 
319 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3. A consortium of 
patients and health plans are also pursuing civil actions for damages based on 
the company’s pricing activities. See In re: Lupron(R) Marketing & Sales 
Practices Litig., 245 F. Supp. 2d 280 (D. Mass. 2003) (denying in part and 
allowing in part the parent company’s motion to dismiss for want of personal 
jurisdiction). 
320 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. 
324 See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3. TAP also pleaded 
guilty to a conspiracy to violate sections 331 and 353 of the Prescription Drug 
Marketing Act of 1987 by selling drug samples, and paid a $290 million 
criminal fine. Id. The qui tam suits included a suit filed by TAP’s former Vice 
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Perhaps the greatest surprise surrounding the TAP case—aside 
from the magnitude of the settlement—was the fact that AWP 
problems had long been a matter of common knowledge. For the 
past thirty years, the federal government has been aware that 
published AWP does not reflect the actual price paid for many 
prescription drugs. As early as 1974, the government sought to 
limit the prices paid to pharmacists under the Medicaid program, 
noting that “the published prices overstate[] the actual prices paid 
by pharmacists by an average of 15 to 18 [percent].”325 Similarly, 
in revising the Medicare physician payment methodology in 1991, 
HHS noted that “the Red Book and other wholesale price guides 
substantially overstate the true cost of drugs.”326 A series of reports 
by the OIG and GAO in the 1990s further illustrated the problem, 
concluding that physicians were able to purchase these products at 
significant discounts from AWP.327 
Prior to late 2003, longstanding recognition of the problem had 
led to several failed legislative and regulatory attempts to revise 
the Medicare drug reimbursement methodology.328 In 2000, for 
example, HCFA sent a memorandum to the Medicare contractors 
announcing an “alternative” source of AWP information developed 
by the DOJ and the National Association of Medicaid Fraud 
 
 
President of Sales, who claimed to have quit because of his concerns about the 
company’s sales and marketing practices, and a suit filed by a urologist 
employed by one of TAP’s HMO customers, who reported that he had been 
offered an “educational grant” if he agreed to reverse the HMO’s decision to 
cover one of Lupron’s less-expensive competitors. Id. The whistleblowers 
received approximately $95 million of the proceeds. Id. 
325 Proposed Regulations Limiting Drug Costs, 39 Fed. Reg. 40,302 (Nov. 
15, 1974). 
326 Dep’t Health & Human Services, Medicare Program: Fee Schedule for 
Physicians’ Services, 56 Fed. Reg. 25,792, 25,800 (proposed June 5, 1991). 
327  See,   e.g.,   GEN.  ACCOUNTING  OFFICE,   MEDICARE:   PAYMENTS FOR 
COVERED  OUTPATIENT  DRUGS  EXCEED  PROVIDERS’   COSTS,  GAO-01-1118 
(Sept. 2001), at 4 (estimating that physicians are able to purchase most 
Medicare-covered drugs at average discounts of 13 to 34 percent off of AWP, 
with some discounts running as high as 65 to 86 percent). 
328 See CMS, Medicare Program; Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68  
Fed. Reg. 50428, 50429 (proposed Aug. 20, 2003) (describing the history of 
payment methodology). 
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Control Units.329 Two months later, HCFA instructed the 
contractors not to use the new data, noting that “congressional 
action may preclude the use of this alternative source.”330 
Similarly, when Congress revisited the payment methodology in 
1997, consensus could only be achieved to reduce payment to 95 
percent of AWP—an amount clearly insufficient to offset the 13 to 
34 percent actual discounts discussed above.331 
The reasons for these failures have been mostly political. Most 
significantly, efforts to revise drug payments have encountered 
strong opposition from the powerful oncology lobby, which has 
argued that the higher reimbursement reflected in the “spread” is 
needed to subsidize the special costs of storing and administering 
oncology drugs.332 Recent reports have suggested that there is 
 
 
 
329 See Program Memorandum AB-00-86 from Department of Health and 
Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration (Sept. 8, 2000), 
available at http://www.cms.gov/manuals/pm_trans/AB0086.pdf. See also, e.g., 
Grant Bagley et al., The Bayer CIA: A Glimpse Into the Future of 
Pharmaceutical Reimbursements?, 5 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 330, 
332-33 (Apr. 18, 2001) (describing unsuccessful attempts to use revised, 
government-generated AWP data for certain drugs). 
330 Program Memorandum AB-00-115 from Department of Health and 
Human Services, Health Care Financing Administration (Nov. 17, 2000), 
available at http:// www.cms.gov/manuals/pm_trans/AB00115.pdf; 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763, § 
429 (imposing moratorium on administrative decreases in drug reimbursement 
rates until completion of GAO study of current payment methodology). In 
August 2003, CMS reopened the issue by publishing a notice in the Federal 
Register proposing to revise the drug payment methodology by one of four 
approaches: (a) enforcing “comparability” between prices paid by contractors 
for drugs for their Medicare and private policyholders; (b) applying a greater 
AWP discount; (c) setting prices based on increased market monitoring; and (d) 
establishing a competitive acquisition program for drugs. Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services, Medicare Program; Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 68 
Fed. Reg. 50428 (proposed Aug. 20, 2003) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 405). 
Due to subsequent legislative activity, however, the future of the CMS 
provisions is unclear. See infra notes 345-51 and accompanying text. 
331 See Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4556(a), 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (amending 42 
U.S.C. § 1395u(o)(1)); supra note 327. 
332 See Iglehart, supra note 316, at 182 (describing the oncology 
community’s opposition to reform efforts). 
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indeed a problem with the current oncology practice expense 
methodology.333 Under Medicare’s general budget-neutral 
approach to practice expenses, however, increasing oncologists’ 
reimbursement would have required an equivalent reduction in 
payments for other types of specialists.334 Faced with the wrath of 
the oncology lobby if drug reimbursement were reduced—and the 
wrath of other powerful physicians’ groups if oncologists’ 
reimbursements were increased at their own expense—turning a 
blind eye to the AWP loophole may have been the most palatable 
alternative. 
Given this historical context, two aspects of the TAP case stand 
out. First, it is somewhat disingenuous to accuse a company of 
committing fraud when it takes advantage of a well-known 
loophole in current law—a loophole there has not yet been the 
political will to close. Second, and more important, the DOJ and 
HHS essentially used the fraud settlement process as a means of 
closing that loophole, at least with respect to TAP’s products. The 
government did this through TAP’s Corporate Integrity 
Agreement, which required the company to report the “Average 
Sales Price” (ASP) of each of its products on a quarterly basis.335 
The ASP is defined as the average of all final sales prices charged 
by TAP for each product to all purchasers except (1) direct sales to 
hospitals and (2) sales not included in calculating the Medicaid 
 
 
333 The GAO has agreed that the reimbursement methodology for 
oncologists should be revisited. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE 
PHYSICIAN FEE SCHEDULE: PRACTICE EXPENSE PAYMENTS TO ONCOLOGISTS 
INDICATE NEED FOR OVERALL REFINEMENTS, GAO-02-53 (Oct. 2001). 
334 See Iglehart, supra note 316, at 1595 (citing remarks by William J. 
Scanlon, director of health care issues for GAO). In the August 2003 Proposed 
Rule, CMS indicated its intent to resolve this issue by increasing the practice 
expense allocation for drug administration. 68 Fed. Reg. at 50,436-39. To the 
extent the payment increases were not offset by the savings from the revised 
drug reimbursement methodology, CMS stated that an exception to the budget 
neutrality requirement would apply. Id. at 50,439. 
335 See Corporate Integrity Agreement Between The Office Of Inspector 
General Of The Department Of Health And Human Services And TAP 
Pharmaceutical Products Inc., § III.D (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Corporate 
Integrity Agreement], available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/ 
tap_pharmaceutical_products_9280l. pdf. 
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rebate “best price.”336 The ASP must be net of all volume 
discounts, prompt pay discounts, cash discounts, chargebacks, 
short-dated products, free goods, rebates, and all other price 
concessions, with the exception of bona fide charity care or 
grants.337 Thus, the ASP is a far more accurate assessment of the 
drug’s average market price than the company-reported AWP. 
Clearly, the ASP reporting requirement was intended not only 
to track the price of the drugs, but also to permit CMS to alter their 
reimbursement. The CIA stated that the pricing information could 
be relied upon by CMS in establishing reimbursement rates for 
TAP’s products, although CMS could not change the rates without 
conducting “meaningful review for all government reimbursed 
therapeutically similar products.”338 Prior to late 2003, however, 
there appeared to be no authority for CMS to obtain ASP 
information from other manufacturers in the Medicare context, 
except on a voluntary basis (or pursuant to CIAs negotiated by 
other companies facing similar litigation).339 Moreover, to the 
extent the Medicare statute at the time mandated reimbursement on 
the basis of either actual charges or 95 percent of AWP, it is not 
clear that CMS had the authority to change reimbursement on the 
basis of ASP information: while ASP may be an average of all 
sales, it is not necessarily an estimate of the price paid by an 
individual physician, nor is it equivalent to the wholesale price.340 
Nonetheless, the CIA was an attempt to accomplish via litigation 
 
 
 
336 Id. at § II.D.2.a 
337 Id. 
338 Id. at § III.D.2.d. The information may also be used by state Medicaid 
programs in establishing reimbursement rates, subject to the provisions of  
TAP’s individual state settlement agreements. Id. 
339  A number of other pharmaceutical companies are under investigation  
for similar practices. See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Bayer to Pay $14 
Million to Settle Claims for Causing Providers to Submit Fraudulent Claims to 
45 State Medicaid Programs, Jan. 23, 2001, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
opa/pr/2001/January/039civ.htm. See also Reed Abelson & Jonathan D. Glater, 
New York Will Sue 2 Big Drug Makers on Doctor Discount, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
13, 2003, at Al (reporting spokeswoman for Aventis as stating “the company 
voluntarily stopped reporting an average wholesale price in August 2001”). 
340 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(o)(1) (2003); 42 C.F.R. § 405.517(b) (2003). 
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something the legislative and regulatory processes had thus far 
failed to achieve: a revision of the Medicare drug reimbursement 
methodology to more accurately reflect the prices paid by 
customers. As one observer has argued, prosecutors “are trying to 
use litigation to force companies to change their practices, not just 
to win damages.”341 
And it was clear that these efforts would not be limited to TAP. 
In the subsequent Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers, the OIG identified the “Integrity of Data Used to 
Establish or Determine Governmental Reimbursement” as one of 
the key risk areas for pharmaceutical manufacturers.342 As  the 
OIG noted, “[t]he government sets reimbursement with the 
expectation that the data provided are complete and accurate. The 
knowing submission of false, fraudulent, or misleading  
information is actionable.”343 Given reports of similar 
investigations against many other large pharmaceutical companies, 
it was quite possible that the OIG would be able to use the CIA 
process to induce pricing changes for many of the products 
reimbursed by the Medicare program—thus, as a practical matter, 
facilitating the underlying goal without resorting to contentious 
legal or regulatory actions.344 
These suspicions were borne out in December 2003, when 
Congress finally passed the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003.345 Under the new 
legislation, reimbursement for outpatient prescription drugs in 
2004 generally will be set at 85 percent of AWP, subject to 
adjustments based on market surveys.346 Beginning in 2005, 
 
 
341 See Abelson & Glater, supra note 339 (quoting law professor Jennifer 
Arlen). 
342 OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 
68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,733 (May 5, 2003) (identifying key risk areas). 
343 Id. at 23,733. 
344 See, e.g., TAP Pharmaceuticals, Bristol-Myers Squibb Targets of 
Federal Marketing, Pricing Probe, 4 HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) 207 
(2001) (describing investigations against other large pharmaceutical companies). 
345 Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 303, 117 Stat. 2066, 2233 (2003) (“Payment 
Reform for Covered Outpatient Drugs and Biologicals”). 
346 Id. at § 303(b)(2), 117 Stat. 2238-39 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 
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payment for single-source drugs will be based on the lesser of: (1) 
the “average sales price,” which is defined broadly to include sales 
to all purchasers except certain “nominal” sales and those 
exempted from the Medicaid best price determination; or (2) the 
“wholesale acquisition cost” (WAC), which is defined as the 
manufacturer’s list price to wholesalers and direct purchasers.347 
The OIG will be required to conduct surveys to monitor the market 
prices of drugs, and reimbursement may be adjusted accordingly; 
manufacturers who misrepresent a drug’s average sales price will 
be subject to civil monetary penalties, as well as FCA liability.348 
Beginning in 2006, physicians will also have the option to obtain 
outpatient drugs through a competitive acquisition system.349 In 
order to address the oncology issues mentioned above, the drug 
pricing revisions are explicitly linked to an increase in practice 
expense reimbursement for drug administration, with such 
revisions exempted from the budget neutrality requirement.350 
It is far too soon to determine whether the new provisions will 
resolve this long-standing debate. Despite the practice expense 
revisions, oncologists have already complained that the post-2005 
reimbursement methodology will disadvantage them 
economically.351 Moreover, the complexity of both the pricing and 
 
 
1395u(o)(4)). 
347 Id. at § 303(c), 117 Stat. 2239-42 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w- 
3a(b)(4), (c)). Moreover, the definition of average sales price is similar to the 
definition of ASP found in the TAP CIA. Id.; Corporate Integrity Agreement, 
supra note 335, at § II.D.2.d. 
348 Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 303(c), 117 Stat. 2243-44 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395w-3a(d)). H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 108-391, at 592 (2003) (“The 
Conferees intend that if a manufacturer knowingly . . . submits false 
information, that such information be considered a ‘false record or statement’ 
made or used ‘to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
government’ for purposes of” the FCA.). 
349 Pub. L. No. 108-173 § 303(d), 117 Stat. 2245-52 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 1395w-3B). 
350 Id. at §§ 303(a), 117 Stat. 2234-37, 2253 (providing for practice expense 
adjustments), (f) (prohibiting the Secretary of HHS from revising drug payment 
amounts in 2004 unless concurrent practice expense adjustments are made). 
351 See, e.g., Darrin Schlegel, US Oncology Says Medicare Changes Threat 
to Profits, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 3, 2003, at Business, p. 1. 
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the practice expense revisions is likely to require extensive 
rulemaking by CMS, which—similar to other anti-fraud initiatives 
described in this article—may result in an unanticipated delay in 
implementation. For our purposes, however, it is significant that 
both these legislative changes and the most recent round of 
proposed regulatory amendments came about only after the widely 
publicized AWP fraud investigations and settlements demonstrated 
that the issue could be resolved. In this way, the litigation process 
not only foreshadowed, but in many ways provided a model for, 
the necessary statutory and regulatory changes. 
 
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE CURRENT REGIME 
 
 
A. Regulatory Ambiguity and Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
The resolution of regulatory ambiguity through selective 
litigation might not be of concern if all parties trusted the process 
to be fair. Unfortunately, the health care industry has alleged that 
the potential for astronomical FCA liability, combined with the 
threat of exclusion from federal health care programs, leaves 
providers virtually no choice but to settle disputes in which they 
might well prevail at trial. As one author has argued, “[p]roviders 
who believe they are blameless are under tremendous pressure to 
settle, because of the legal expenses associated with mounting a 
defense, and the high probability of bankruptcy and professional 
disgrace if the jury does not see things the same way the provider 
does.”352 Provider organizations have gone further, characterizing 
recent fraud enforcement initiatives as “border[ing] on 
extortion.”353 There is indeed some evidence to support these 
complaints, including a GAO report concluding that the United 
States Attorneys’ Offices participating in the “Operation Bad 
 
 
352 Hyman, supra note 1, at 155. See also id. at 166 (arguing that “settling 
these cases, at almost any price, became the only viable option” for hospitals 
targeted by the PATH initiative). 
353 GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, [Untitled Report], B-279893 (July 22,  
1998), at 15 n.30 (describing comments made by the Louisiana Hospital 
Association). 
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Bundle” laboratory initiative had no evidentiary basis for targeting 
the hospitals they selected for investigation.354 And even  the 
courts have acknowledged that the government’s enforcement 
efforts have, on occasion, been “rather draconian.”355 
That regulators wield significant power to encourage 
settlements—even in situations in which abstract legal analysis 
might favor the defendant—is not a novel proposition. 
Administrative law scholars have long acknowledged that, where 
not constrained by judicial review, the balance of power favors the 
government in settlement negotiations.356 As one commentator 
notes, “the agency possesses the ability to impose its will on the 
firm in ways which may not be authorized by the governing 
statute, may not have been envisioned by the creators of the 
agency, and indeed may exceed the agency’s formal powers.”357 
Characterizing the process as “administrative arm-twisting,” 
another commentator argues that the practice “succeeds, and 
evades judicial or other scrutiny, in part because companies in 
pervasively regulated industries believe that they cannot afford to 
resist agency demands.”358 
In addition to raising concerns about fairness to the industry,359 
this approach also promotes a form of “regulation by litigation”— 
the agency’s ability to demand compliance with conditions of 
participation that are not required, and perhaps not permitted, 
under current law. This danger arises under any enforcement 
scheme that permits the ex ante imposition of negotiated  
conditions before a regulated entity is permitted to participate (or 
 
 
354 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: DOJ’S 
IMPLEMENTATION OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE IN NATIONAL INITIATIVES 
VARIES, GAO/HEHS-99-170 (Aug. 1999), at 4 (analyzing investigations); 
Hyman, supra note 1, at 165-66 (describing laboratory bundling investigations). 
355 Ass’n. of Am. Med. Coll. v. United States, 217 F.3d 770, 781 (9th Cir. 
2000) (noting that the “OIG could still modify its rather draconian view of the 
[Medicare] Act’s requirements for Part B billing”). 
356 See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 8; Noah, supra note 274. 
357 Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1299. 
358 Noah, supra note 274, at 922. 
359 See Krause, supra note 49, at 210-12 (describing the importance of fair 
FCA enforcement to the perceived legitimacy of the anti-fraud agenda). 
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in this case to continue participating) in the relevant market: 
The basic substantive concern . . . is that agencies and 
agency personnel will use the relatively unfettered 
authority they enjoy . . . in order to coerce compliance from 
regulated entities with substantive rules and interpretations 
which are of their own creation and are inconsistent with 
the norms laid out by the legislature or the courts.360 
Of course, the bare fact that an administrative agency interprets (or 
even makes) law is not improper; indeed, the whole of 
administrative law is predicated on the premise that agency 
expertise is necessary to give meaning to the broad laws passed by 
Congress.361 Moreover, the ability of an administrative agency to 
make law via means other than the traditional notice-and-comment 
or adjudicatory processessuch as through informal guidelines, 
advisory opinions, and public statements by agency officials—has 
been well-documented.362 The use of such informal processes, 
however, necessarily means that a great deal of agency lawmaking 
takes place outside the established process for judicial review of 
administrative actions.363 This is particularly troubling in light of 
the fact that courts often defer to the positions expressed by the 
agency in such informal guidance.364 The above discussion 
 
 
360 Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1304. 
361 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
844 (1984) (deferring to an agency’s interpretation of its own statutory 
mandate). 
362 See, e.g., Waller, supra note 175, at 1404-05 (describing the 
development of antitrust guidelines); Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1304-05 
(describing the scope of delegated rulemaking authority). 
363 See Bhagwat, supra note 8, at 1304-05 (noting that traditional 
rulemaking and adjudicatory processes occur in the context of judicial review, 
whereas “coerc[ed] . . . compliance [occurs] in a context where outside 
supervision is lacking”); Noah, supra note 274, at 936-37 (arguing that “[t]he 
opportunity to challenge agency action in court provides a critical deterrent to 
arbitrary action”). 
364 See, e.g., Waller, supra note 175, at 1407-08 (noting that courts defer to 
the antitrust guidelines); Zimmer, Inc. v. Nu-Tech Med., Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 
850, 862 (N.D. Ind. 1999) (agreeing with an OIG Advisory Opinion that found 
that an arrangement potentially violated the Anti-Kickback Statute); supra Part 
III.B.2. 
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suggests that all of these concerns may be present in current health 
care fraud enforcement. 
Similar concerns arise with regard to the exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion outside the regulatory context, such  as 
with the DOJ’s enforcement of the FCA in health care cases. Given 
the broad contours of the FCA and Anti-Kickback Statute, perhaps 
the extent of prosecutorial innovation in health care should not be 
surprising. As Charles Ruff once noted, “[l]ike Nature, the federal 
prosecutor abhors a vacuum. Given a statutory grant of 
jurisdiction, he will seek to bring within it any offense he finds 
unattended or even, in his view, inadequately attended.”365 
Congress is incapable of predicting all situations in which a new 
law may be invoked; instead, it enacts broad prohibitions which 
“are brought into contact with the real world only through the 
mediation of intricate judge-made doctrines that specify what these 
laws actually prohibit.”366 Where a statute leaves room for 
interpretation as to the prohibited conduct, as with the anti-fraud 
statutes, prosecutors will be motivated to “bring previously 
undefined conduct to trial in the hope that the court will 
criminalize it.”367 But while prosecutors play a necessary role in 
interpreting broad statutes, they must take care not to undertake the 
heart of the legislative function: defining the contours of prohibited 
public behavior.368 
Although understandable from the perspective of law 
enforcement, this process proves to be less than ideal for providing 
 
 
 
365 Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case 
Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1228 
(1977). 
366 Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 
HARV. L. REV. 469, 471 (1996). As Kahan notes, “[t]o be sure, Congress must 
speak before a person can be convicted of a federal crime, but it needn’t say 
much of anything when it does.” Id. 
367 Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: 
Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 179 (1994). 
368 See Kahan, supra note 366, at 479-81 (explaining why “prosecutors end 
up with a significant share of delegated lawmaking authority”); Moohr, supra 
note 367, at 179 (noting that in such circumstances, “lawmaking devolves to law 
enforcers”). 
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notice to potential defendants. As scholars have long 
acknowledged, federal prosecutors have strong personal incentives 
to apply the law in ways that benefit their personal agendas rather 
than the public good.369 Moreover, individual prosecutors may 
“internalize the political benefits and externalize the practical and 
human costs of adventurous readings of federal criminal law.”370 
Nowhere are those costs greater than in disputes over the proper 
scope “of statutes that mark the boundary line between socially 
desirable and socially undesirable behavior.”371 Health care anti- 
fraud statutes mark such a boundary: they protect against improper 
financial activities, while at the same time encouraging the 
provision of legitimate medical services and providing the 
flexibility necessary for the development of more efficient and 
higher quality delivery mechanisms. It is precisely in such 
circumstances where clear guidance is crucial in order to “avoid 
deterring desirable conduct.”372 
The danger is that an overemphasis on enforcement may lull 
regulators into complacency, where they seek to delay difficult 
policy decisions in the hopes that the desired results instead may  
be achieved through the litigation process. There is some evidence 
that this has occurred in health care. As one judge recently 
observed in the nursing home context, “although extensive 
regulatory authority exists for punishing unscrupulous facilities, 
the Government has increasingly opted for the expedited results of 
lawsuits under the FCA’s powerful threats of significant fines, 
treble damages, and costly litigation fees.”373 Similarly, the 
 
 
369 See Kahan, supra note 366, at 486-87 (noting the phenomenon of 
“prosecutorial overreaching”). 
370 Id. at 487-88. 
371 Id. at 485. 
372 Hyman, supra note 1, at 539. See also Kahan, supra note 366, at 485 
(arguing that “‘fair warning’ or notice” is most important in such situations); 
Noah, supra note 274, at 936 (arguing that “reliance on individualized 
bargaining undermines consistency and invites the standardless (and largely 
unaccountable) exercise of agency discretion”). 
373 United States v. NHC Healthcare Corp., 115 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1152 
(W.D. Mo. 2000). A similar process appears to be underway in the 
Environmental Protection Agency, where commentators argue that “[w]ith the 
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ongoing pharmaceutical pricing investigations arose after more 
than thirty years of government awareness that the Medicare drug 
reimbursement system was flawed, during which time neither 
Congress nor HCFA/CMS was able to muster the political will to 
make the necessary changes.374 From both an academic and a 
practical perspective, it is problematic when enforcement is given a 
higher priority than clarifying the applicable regulations. So long 
as providers feel compelled to settle these allegations, however, 
there appears to be little incentive for regulators to make these 
necessary, and often controversial, policy revisions. 
 
B. The Role of Private Relators 
 
The fraud enforcement environment is complicated 
significantly by the presence of private relators under the FCA, 
who are free to bring suit even when the government declines to 
pursue the allegations.375 It is one thing to provide government 
prosecutors with the discretion to pursue novel interpretations of a 
broad statute; it is quite another to permit private individuals to 
reap multi-million dollar recoveries by using the FCA to pursue 
violations of ambiguous program rules containing no private rights 
of action.376 Although the drafters of the 1986 FCA amendments 
envisioned qui tam relators as helpful sources of information that 
otherwise would not have been available to the government, the 
reality has been quite different.377 The Supreme Court has 
 
 
priority on meeting referral targets and collecting fines, enforcement officials 
forego opportunities to assist in diagnosing and solving the technical or 
production problems that can lead to noncompliance. This approach to 
enforcement robs the regulatory process of important feedback concerning how 
well the rules work.” Freeman, supra note 149, at 17. 
374 See supra Part III.C.2.b. See also Patrick Hooper, Health Care Fraud 
Frenzy: An Exercise in Overzealous Law Enforcement, 1 HEALTH CARE FRAUD 
REP. (BNA) 799 (1997) (arguing that “Congress and federal and state agency 
policy-makers are delegating by default substantial policy-making authority to 
enforcement agencies and prosecutors”). 
375 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2003). 
376 Cf. Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) (decrying the expansion of civil RICO cases by private litigants). 
377 See S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 4, 23 (1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
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acknowledged this, cynically concluding that  “qui  tam  relators 
are . . . motivated primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather 
than the public good.”378 Critics have argued that the FCA qui tam 
provisions undermine prosecutorial discretion by permitting 
relators to maintain suits that the government has declined to join, 
and by requiring the government to expend significant resources to 
review voluminous qui tam filings.379 While prosecutorial 
discretion may be an imperfect screen for preventing unjustified 
expansion of the FCA, it is infinitely preferable to a bounty system 
enforced by private individuals who have no obligation to further 
the government’s—or for that matter the patient’s—health care 
interests.380 
These observations are not unique to the health care industry. 
Statutory enforcement by private parties has long been subject to 
allegations of abuse. Indeed, the FCA qui tam provisions are now 
unique in American law in part because such statutes fell out of 
favor in England in the 1600s, “due in large part to abuses by the 
informers, such as fraudulent prosecutions and extortion.”381 
Indeed, concern over the role of private parties in regulatory 
 
 
 
at 5269, 5288 (“Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation 
of individuals who are either close observers or otherwise involved in the 
fraudulent activity.”). 
378 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 
(1997). 
379 As Professor James Blumstein has argued, permitting such qui tam suits 
in the Anti-Kickback context “allows the pursuit of a suit for civil liability 
without the restraining influence of a government official’s exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion.” Blumstein, supra note 154, at 218. See also Marsha J. 
Ferziger & Daniel G. Currell, Snitching for Dollars: The Economics and Public 
Policy of Federal Civil Bounty Programs, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1171, 
1185 (1999) (noting that “private enforcers have no incentive to engage in 
discretionary nonenforcement” and that false “tips” can be costly because they 
consume scarce agency resources). 
380 See William E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Suits as Monitoring 
Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1825 (1996) 
(“While the interests of public enforcement officials may not be perfectly 
congruent with taxpayer interests, it is likely that the aims of qui tam relators 
and taxpayers also are not invariably congruent.”). 
381 Bales, supra note 270, at 386. 
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decisionmaking permeates administrative law. As Professor Jody 
Freeman has explained: 
Private actors exacerbate all of the concerns that make the 
exercise of agency discretion so problematic. They are one 
step further removed from direct accountability to the 
electorate . . . . As nonstate actors, they remain relatively 
insulated from the legislative, executive, and judicial 
oversights to which agencies must submit . . . . [They] may 
pursue different goals and respond to different incentives 
than do public agencies, interfering with their capacity to 
be as public-regarding as we expect agencies to be.382 
Thus, there is a long-standing perception that it is improper for 
agencies to delegate substantial enforcement authority to private 
entities. 
Compelling as it may be, however, this view of agency 
authority is far too simplistic. Private parties are given a role in 
enforcement precisely because experience has also shown us that 
administrative agencies, left to their own devices, are apt to be 
“captured by the interests they purport to regulate.”383 As Professor 
Spencer Weber Waller has noted, “[p]ublic choice theory suggests 
that . . . regulation[] is rarely, if ever, practiced to maximize an 
abstract form of the public interest, but rather represents a 
battleground for warring private interests.”384 In this context, the 
role of private “watchdogs” is crucialas it was in fifteenth 
century England, where qui tam provisions first developed to 
counter disincentives for government officials to enforce the 
 
 
 
382 Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 543, 574 (2000) [hereinafter, Freeman, Private Role]; Kovacic, supra note 
380, at 1831-32 (explaining reasons why relators may “attack conduct that is 
benign”). 
383 Waller, supra note 175, at 1428. Moreover, private relators may be able 
to provide “inside information” that the government otherwise might not be able 
to obtain. See Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory 
World, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 905, 940 (2002) (“Complex economic wrongdoing 
cannot be detected or deterred effectively without the help of those who are 
intimately familiar with it.”). 
384 Waller, supra note 175, at 1428. 
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property laws.385 The need for public oversight was evident in the 
debates surrounding the 1986 FCA amendments, particularly with 
regard to the defense industry: 
Congress believed that many public officials were active 
participants in the corruption and therefore were unlikely to 
enforce the law diligently. Congress wanted to give defense 
industry functionaries a strong incentive to inform on 
fraudulent defense contractors, and create an enforcement 
mechanism that was independent of the Department of 
Justice officials who often were part of the problem.386 
By providing an alternative source of information to supplement 
government investigations—and an alternate means of 
enforcement to counter government inertia—the qui  tam 
provisions establish a mechanism for independent assessment of 
the government’s enforcement priorities.387 Thus, while private 
enforcement may impose significant costs, it also offers much- 
needed oversight.388 
The dangers of restricting the private role in enforcement can 
be illustrated by an all-too-recent example from the securities 
industry. During the 1990s, Congress became concerned with the 
volume of private securities fraud litigation, which critics 
characterized as “scandalous” and “legalized extortion by the 
plaintiffs bar.”389 In response, Congress sought to restrict the 
primary vehicle through which such private litigation had been 
brought: the civil provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which permit “[a]ny person 
injured in his business or property” to bring suit for treble 
 
 
385 Bales, supra note 270, at 386. 
386 Id. at 388. 
387 See Freeman, Private Role, supra note 382, at 663-64 (identifying 
advantages of private attorneys general); Ferziger & Currell, supra note 379, at 
1200 (arguing in favor of properly constructed bounty systems). 
388 See Bales, supra note 270, at 430 (arguing that “Congress made the 
policy choice, when it passed the FCA, that the benefits of vigorous enforcement 
of the laws prohibiting fraud against the government outweigh the drawbacks of 
dispersing prosecutorial power among the public”). 
389 141 CONG. REC. H.15215 (daily ed. Dec. 20, 1995) (remarks of Rep. 
Bliley in favor of overriding presidential veto of legislation). 
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damages.390 In the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 
1995 (PSLRA), Congress prohibited civil RICO suits based on 
allegations of fraud in the purchase or sale of securities.391 While 
the amendment was an efficient method of preventing frivolous 
suits in the short term, the long-term consequences of abolishing 
this mechanism of private oversight of the securities industry did 
not become apparent for several years. In hindsight, some 
commentators attribute the recent Enron debacle, in part, to the 
significant reduction in legal risks faced by auditors and other 
“gatekeepers” once such private litigation was no longer 
permitted.392 Thus, the health care industry should take a lesson 
from the securities industry: in our zeal to level the playing field 
for health care providers relative to qui tam relators, we must take 
care not to enact similarly counterproductive measures that allow 
fraud to flourish undetected, with similarly disastrous 
consequences. 
 
C. Reconceptualizing Our Approach to Fraud 
 
As the above discussion demonstrates, the current federal 
approach to health care fraud rests on an untenable combination of 
regulatory inertia, a proliferation of informal non-binding 
guidance, and an increasing amount of public and  private 
litigation. Yet while deep dissatisfaction within the provider 
community is a legitimate concern, we cannot simply foreclose the 
litigation route—neither for government officials, nor for the 
private relators who both revitalize and complicate the 
enforcement process. How, then, can we increase fairness in health 
care fraud enforcement, while not sacrificing efficiency? 
First and foremost, it is important to clarify key regulatory 
 
 
390 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2003) (defining RICO remedies). 
391 Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 758, Tit. I., § 107 (1995) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2003)) (stating, “no person may rely upon any conduct that 
would have been actionable as fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to 
establish a violation” of RICO). 
392 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Understanding Enron: “Its About the 
Gatekeepers, Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1409 (2002) (identifying the PSLRA 
as one reason the legal risks for auditors decreased during the 1990s). 
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“gray areas.” As Professor Dan Kahan has argued: 
The law deters a particular form of wrongdoing most 
effectively when it prohibits it in clear terms. If a statute 
prohibits a particular form of wrongdoing only 
ambiguously, some individuals will engage in it either out 
of ignorance of the law or in the hope that courts will 
resolve the ambiguity in their favor. Ultimately, then, the 
best way to prevent the exploitation of a potential loophole 
is to close it.393 
Recent experience has demonstrated that it is indeed possible to 
close regulatory loopholes in the health care context. For example, 
Medicare covers only those items and services that are “reasonable 
and necessary,” criteria that have been interpreted to preclude 
coverage of “experimental or investigational” drugs and devices.394 
In 1986, HCFA issued instructions denying coverage for medical 
devices that had not been approved by the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA).395 When the OIG began to investigate 
widespread hospital billing for unapproved devices in the mid- 
1990s, a group of hospitals challenged the validity of these 
instructions.396  Although the suit was  not successful, a 
simultaneous lobbying effort persuaded the government to develop 
a mechanism for covering a limited group of non-approved devices 
that are designated  by  the FDA  as “non- 
experimental/investigational” in nature.397 Similar clarifications in 
regulatory “gray areas,” as may be occurring with pharmaceutical 
pricing, would go a long way towards assuaging industry concerns. 
Second, even in the absence of regulatory clarification, 
 
 
393 Kahan, supra note 366, at 493-94. 
394 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2003) (reasonable and necessary 
criteria); Medicare Part A Intermediary Letter, No. 77-4 (Jan. 1977), reprinted  
in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 28,152 (excluding coverage of 
experimental or investigational items and services). 
395 See, e.g., Medicare Hospital Manual § 260.1, reprinted in Cedars-Sinai 
Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 939 F. Supp 1457, 1462 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
396 Cedars-Sinai, 939 F. Supp. at 1457. 
397 See 42 C.F.R. § 405.201-15 (2003). This category includes low-risk 
devices and newer generations of previously approved devices that present only 
incremental risks over their predecessors. Id. 
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prosecutorial discretion should be exercised so as to minimize the 
unfairness resulting from fraud investigations based on good faith 
interpretations of ambiguous provisions. For example, in the mid- 
1990s, the OIG undertook the nationwide PATH initiative to 
investigate whether hospitals had improperly billed for “physician” 
services that were actually rendered by interns and residents.398 
Although regulations clarified in 1995 that Medicare would pay 
only when the attending physician was physically present at the 
time services were rendered, hospitals argued that the policy prior 
to that time had been unclear.399 HHS eventually admitted that the 
standards had “not been consistently and clearly articulated,” and 
limited future audits to hospitals in regions where the Medicare 
carrier had clearly explained the rules prior to 1993.400 As positive 
as this resolution may have been, however, it suffers from a 
significant limitation: it does not apply to suits brought by qui tam 
relators, who need not abide by the government’s prosecution 
decisions.401 
Third, as the author has suggested elsewhere, it might be 
possible to devise a format in which the critical legal issue—a 
 
 
398 See generally, Bucy, supra note 34 (describing the initiative). Medicare 
Part B pays for patient care services by attending physicians in hospitals; interns 
and residents are funded by general graduate medical education payments made 
to the hospital under Medicare Part A, and may not bill for services to individual 
patients. Id. at 4. 
399  See id. at 7-13 (describing the history of HHS guidance on this issue);  
42 C.F.R. § 415.172 (2003) (final regulations). The hospitals were so convinced 
of the unfairness of the government’s position that they brought suit against 
HHS to prevent further enforcement. See Assn. of Am. Med. Coll. v. United 
States, 217 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming the dismissal of suit for want of 
jurisdiction, but without prejudice). 
400 See Letter from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel of HHS, to Jordan J. 
Cohen, President of the Association of American Medical Colleges (July 11, 
1997) (admitting lack of clarity and limiting future audits), available at 
http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/oig711.htm. The OIG later withdrew from 
PATH audits at sixteen facilities whose communications with carriers had been 
unclear. See Aussprung, supra note 37, at 24. 
401 See Kovacic, supra note 380, at 1848 (calling for the DOJ to exercise its 
screening function more vigorously “to eliminate erroneous or frivolous suits” 
by qui tam relators); 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2003) (describing the procedure if 
the United States elects not to intervene in the suit). 
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novel theory of falsity or fraud—could be tested without subjecting 
the defendant to the full range of FCA liability.402 For example, the 
parties might stipulate to the scope of liability, such as the number 
and value of claims submitted, and agree to test the legal theory in 
a bench trial.403 If the judge found the legal theory to be valid, the 
defendant would be subject to damages and penalties in the 
stipulated amounts. A ruling against the government, on the other 
hand, would serve as binding precedent that the defendant had not 
violated the FCA. If feasible, such a mechanism could provide 
judicial oversight of the theory of falsity, the crucial ingredient 
missing from current FCA enforcement. Again, however, this 
approach would be of limited utility if it did not apply to qui tam 
suits as well as government actions. 
Finally, it may be time to rethink the current qui tam incentive 
structure, at least as it pertains to health care fraud. The number of 
qui tam cases filed since the 1986 amendments suggests that the 
drafters’ strategy is working, perhaps better than anyone 
anticipated.404 Yet the success of a private bounty system should  
be measured by more than just the sheer number of cases filed; 
rather, it should be measured by the number of filings that identify 
actual fraud. This in turn requires that the incentive structure be 
neither too remote to induce participation from insiders, nor so 
generous as to tempt them to file meritless suits. 
Good informant tips alert an agency to clear violations of 
law for which a high monetary penalty can be imposed; the 
worst tips alert agencies to actions that appear to be 
violations but are not. In these latter cases, the agency 
invests enforcement costs, and the defendant incurs defense 
costs, to engage in litigation yielding no penalty. These tips 
are not just “noise” in the system; they cost the agency 
 
 
 
402 See Krause, supra note 49, at 215-16. 
403 A similar approach has been used to avoid litigating thousands of 
individual claims in FCA cases. See, e.g., United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 
5 (D.D.C. 1994) (trying FCA case involving eight thousand claims on the basis 
of two hundred representative claims for seven representative patients). 
404 See FCA Statistics, supra note 61 (stating that in 1998, approximately 
two-thirds of qui tam suits involved the federal health care programs). 
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scarce enforcement resources, driving down the bounty 
scheme’s overall efficiency. More troubling, such tips lead 
to unwarranted enforcement actions that give rise to the 
most well-grounded political objections to bounty schemes 
as a whole.405 
Commentators suggest that the ideal bounty system is one that 
combines a relatively small bounty (such as 3 percent of the 
recovery) with a relatively high degree of certainty that the bounty 
will be paid.406 While a full discussion of the FCA qui tam 
incentive structure is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth 
noting that the current system appears to do much the opposite: it 
offers extraordinarily high recoveries for a few successful relators, 
but leaves the majority with nothing.407 Whether a more targeted 
bounty system might relieve provider anxiety without sacrificing 
truth and efficiency remains to be seen. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Clearly, health care fraud enforcement is flourishing. By 
emphasizing that fraud is both a quality and an economic issue—as 
in the nursing home context—prosecutors have characterized 
enforcement as protecting both beneficiaries and the public fisc.408 
Similarly, in the prescription drug context, alleged overpricing has 
been characterized as harming both the federal health care 
programs and the patients who are responsible for artificially high 
copayments.409 This has proven to be powerful rhetoric. 
 
 
405 Ferziger & Currell, supra note 379, at 1197-98 (describing a model 
bounty system). 
406 Id. 
407 See, e.g., Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, supra note 3 (describing TAP 
relators’ recovery of $95 million); Kovacic, supra note 380, at 1845-46 
(objecting to FCA incentives that encourage relators to wait until damages are 
significant before filing suit, and noting that “[i]t is unwise to tie the firefighter’s 
reward to the total size of the blaze extinguished”); but see Ferziger & Currell, 
supra note 379, at 1186 (arguing that several FCA mechanisms exist to deter 
“overzealous enforcement”). 
408 See supra notes 303-309 and accompanying text. 
409 See, e.g., CMS, Medicare Program: Payment Reform for Part B Drugs, 
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It seems unlikely that the current Administration will reverse 
this trend, even in light of the war against terrorism. The 
individuals who have taken the lead in fraud enforcement at the 
OIG, the DOJ, and the United States Attorneys’ Offices generally 
are not political appointees. At a time of looming budget deficits, 
when recent audits still identify $12 billion a year in improper 
Medicare payments, the government simply cannot afford to be 
“soft” on fraud. Moreover, if the new Medicare prescription drug 
program is ever to become a reality, a continued influx of funds 
from fraud recoveries (among other sources) is likely to be 
needed.410 
What will the future hold? This much seems clear: the 
pharmaceutical industry is back under scrutiny, not only for its 
sales and marketing activities, but also for its drug pricing methods 
and sponsorship of medical research.411 Similarly, the quality of 
care in nursing homes continues to generate a great deal of 
concern, which has been addressed both through traditional 
regulatory oversight mechanisms and, more recently, using the 
FCA.412 Indeed, the growing reliance on the FCA to enforce 
nursing home quality standards may signal the broader use of the 
law to address quality concerns in other health care contexts, such 
as hospitals and perhaps managed care organizations.413 
The conceptual model outlined above suggests that we will 
continue to see three separate mechanisms for reducing health care 
fraud: traditional notice-and-comment regulation; an ever- 
 
 
68 Fed. Reg. 50,428, 50,443 (proposed Aug. 20, 2003) (describing how pricing 
proposals would save money for beneficiaries). 
410 See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 101(a)(2), 117 Stat. 2066, 2072 (2003) 
(implementing prescription drug benefit as of January 1, 2006) (to be codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101(a)(2)). 
411 See Notice, Department of Health and Human Services, OIG 
Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 65 Fed. Reg. 
23,731 (May 5, 2003) (identifying risk areas for drug manufacturers). 
412 See Notice, Department of Health and Human Services, OIG  
Compliance Program Guidance for Nursing Facilities, 65 Fed. Reg. 14,289 
(Mar. 16, 2000) (identifying risk areas for the nursing home industry). 
413 See Joan H. Krause, Medicare Error as False Claim, 27 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 181 (2001) (discussing the potential applicability of the FCA to hospitals). 
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increasing variety of informal guidance; and a combination of 
private and public enforcement brought not simply against 
providers who engage in “raw fraud,”414 but also against those who 
act in accordance with defensible interpretations of ambiguous 
laws and regulations. Yet experience suggests that this may not be 
a feasible strategy for the industry in the long run. Instead, the 
hallmark of an efficient anti-fraud strategy should be clarity: clear 
rules to be followed by those who participate in the federal health 
care programs, and clear penalties for those who stray. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
414 James F. Blumstein, What Precisely is “Fraud” in the Health Care 
Industry?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1997, at A25. 
